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Public policy of most developed countries intervenes in the spatial
distribution of economic activity. First of all, this concerns large-scale
programs that are designed specifically for the purpose of directing re-
sources towards well defined geographic areas such as inter-regional
transfers, place-based subsidies and local tax exemptions. These inter-
ventions are usually motivated by the widespread concern that eco-
nomic development generates unequal living conditions across
regions. While there have been ample empirical studies about the ef-
fects of transfers in recipient regions, the general equilibrium effects of
these policies are not well understood (see Neumark and Simpson,
2015). We make progress in this direction by evaluating the general
equilibrium effects of European regional transfers based on recent ad-
vances in the quantitative analysis of economic geography (see e.g.
Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Redding and Rossi-Hansberg, 2017).ri),
. This is an open access article under
hrlich, On the optimal design o
.2020.103319Place-based policies cover a range of measures: The most important
ones include wage subsidies, investments in local transportation infra-
structure, and transfers aimed at strengthening local productivity.1 In
our application of EU regional policy these categories represent about
80% percent of total expenditure. The relevance and nature of spillovers
to non-treated regions – and thus the general equilibrium effects – vary
significantly across these threegeneral typesof place-basedpolicy instru-
ments. For instance, wage subsidies exert spillovers via market-size ef-
fects, local transportation investments have immediate consequences
for the entire transportation network, and local productivity gains dissi-
pate to non-recipient regions via the price indices of imported goods.
Our analysis shows thatEU regional transfers have improvedwelfare
significantly for the period 2007–13. At the same time, we demonstrate
that substantial further welfare gains could have been reached by
reallocating transfers across regions without increasing the budget. By1 We consider transfers focusing on local technological development as investments in
production amenities, e.g. investments in local energy supply, schools or broadband tech-
nologies. For projects examples of EU regional policy see http://ec.europa.eu/regional_
policy/en/projects.
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type, we show that wage subsidies should rather be directed to a few
poor and peripheral regions while investments in transport infrastruc-
ture are most efficient in highly productive and/or core regions. Invest-
ments in transport infrastructure and production amenities are
complementary and have contributed more to welfare than wage
subsidies.
We incorporate the main types of regional transfers into a quantita-
tive model capturing costly inter-regional trade, population mobility
and endogenous agglomeration economies. We fit the multi-region
model to detailed data about European NUTS2 regions spanning a pe-
riod of 20 years and thereby recover location fundamentals reflecting
regional consumption and production amenities.2 The application fo-
cuses on one of the largest regional policy schemes: The European
Structural & Cohesion Funds. Already since 1975, these policies are cen-
tral to the process of European integration and since then the budget
has grown continuously. During the budgeting period 2007–13, the
Structural & Cohesion Funds accounted for approximately one third of
the EU's total budget (European Commission, 2008). Using novel data
that specifies not only the regional distribution of transfers but also
the type of expenditure, we obtain causal estimates of the direct (partial
equilibrium) effects of transfers on local outcomes.
By estimating the core model parameters for the specific context of
EUNUTS2 regions, we ensure that ourmodel performswell inmatching
empirically observed patterns across European regions. Combining the
model structure and the estimated parameters, we are in a position to
study the general equilibrium effects of transfers. In particular, we ana-
lyze the effects of place-based policies on aggregate efficiency and re-
gional inequality, as measured by the coefficients of variation of
income and population density. We compare the observed equilibrium
to counterfactual scenarios where transfers are discontinued or distrib-
uted based on a naive rule that pays a uniform transfer to every region.
Ultimately, we are interested in the degree of welfare gain one could
reach by optimally designing the place-based policy without expanding
the size of the program. To this end, we solve a global optimization
problem and derive the welfare optimal distribution of transfers across
regions for each transfer type given the current level of taxes.
The counterfactual simulations suggest that the EU place-based pol-
icy led to a positive welfare effect of 2.08% compared to a scenario with-
out transfers. This effect is mainly driven by improvements in the
average level of public infrastructure because the existing policy does
not realize the potential of distributing the investments in a welfare op-
timizing way across regions. In particular, this becomes evident when
comparing the current scheme to the uniform distribution of transfers.
Considering all transfer types jointly, this naive rule dominates and
would yield additional efficiency gains of 0.52%age points compared to
the existing scheme.We find that switching to the optimal distributions
for all transfer types while keeping taxes as well as the aggregate mix of
types constant would raise aggregate welfare in the European Union by
approximately 1.06percentage points compared to the existing scheme.
For individual transfer types, the most sizable benefits from moving to
the optimal spatial distribution can be realized for wage subsidies:
There, the existing benefit can be quadrupled.
Below, we discuss our approach with reference to the literature. We
introduce the model in Section 3 and describe the estimation of model
parameters in Section 4. Counterfactual policy scenarios are analyzed
in Section 5. The last section summarizes and draws conclusions about
potential reforms of transfers in Europe.2 Eurostat, the statistical agency of the European Union, operates a regional classifica-
tion scheme (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales Statistiques) where NUTS2 corre-
sponds to regional entities of 0.8 m to 3 m inhabitants. Currently, the EU consists of 273
NUTS2 regions.
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Our paper relates to a sizable strand of literature evaluating the ef-
fects of place-based policies (e.g. Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2008; Kline and
Moretti, 2014; Neumark and Simpson, 2015). Boldrin and Canova
(2001) initiated a number of studies focusing on place-based policies
in the EU. Becker et al. (2010) address the endogeneity of transfer
recipience by exploiting a discontinuity in the mechanism that deter-
mined transfer eligibility and show that the policy induced local growth
and income effects beyond a simple consumption stimulus.3 In order to
estimate the parameters underlying the link between local characteris-
tics and transfers, we follow their quasi-experimental identification
strategy but apply it to outcomes that have not yet been studied, i.e.
we estimate the impact of regional transfers on local production ameni-
ties and transportation costs.
Most evaluations of place-based policies use reduced-form analyses
and identify the local effects in recipient regions. Hence, theymostly ig-
nore spillovers on other regions and thus quantify partial equilibriumef-
fects. However, the aggregate efficiency of spatially targeted transfers
depends critically on migration responses, adjustments in land rents
and local prices in general. Migration responses to place-based transfers
can be substantial as documented by Einiö and Overman (2016) and
Ehrlich and Seidel (2018) for regional transfers in the UK and
Germany. Consistent with our findings, Egger et al. (2014) document
that EU transfers have reduced net migration across member countries.
Complex spatial interactions occur not only via relocation of households
andfirms but also via interregional trade and investments.4 Accordingly,
for a comprehensive evaluation of the effectiveness of place-based poli-
cies, migration and trade channels are relevant. Reduced-form analyses
are usually not capable of identifying these interdependencies. In partic-
ular, as these spillovers are not limited to neighboring regions, a struc-
tural framework is required to derive the net effect of place-based
policies.5 The EU recognizes the importance of spillovers and expects
that “allMember States benefit frompositive spillovers generated by in-
vestments in cohesion countries” (see European Commission, 2017).
We show that partial equilibrium effects focusing on the local effects
in recipient regions significantly overestimate the impact of wage subsi-
dies and investments in production amenities. However, positive spill-
overs dominate for investments in transportation infrastructure.
In order to identify the general equilibrium effects of place-based
policies, we build upon recent work in quantitative economic geogra-
phy (e.g. Allen and Arkolakis, 2014; Caliendo et al., 2018; Redding,
2016; Desmet et al., 2018) and link it to data about regional characteris-
tics. The combination of a structural model, regional panel data, and
quasi-experimental variation in transfer recipience allows us to esti-
mate almost all parameters of the model, compute spatial equilibria
that materialize under different policy schemes, and to conduct welfare
analyses. Assuming that the identified parameters of the model remain
constant, we can compute the effects of large-scale policy changes. The
non-linearities prevalent in economic geography (both in theory and
data) make it particularly relevant to go beyond marginal changes as
typically obtained in empirical evaluations.
Our paper closely relates to recent contributions in the quantitative
analysis of the spatial effects of public policies: Fajgelbaum et al.
(2019) and Eeckhout and Guner (2017) evaluate the degree of spatial
misallocation due to taxes; Ossa (2017) analyzes welfare costs ofFurther reduced-form evaluations of European regional policy include Midelfart-
Knarvik and Overman (2002), Mohl and Hagen (2010), Pellegrini et al. (2013).
4 E.g., an increase in local incomewill raise demand not only for locally produced goods
but also for goods produced in regions that have close trade links with the transfer recip-
ient. Similarly, changes in productivity and transportation costswill induce a reshuffling of
bilateral trade.
5 Some reduced form analyses reduce the issue of spillovers (i.e. the violation of the sta-
ble unit treatment value assumption in the identification of the treatment effect) by ex-
cluding observations in the spatial proximity of treated regions from the control group
(e.g. Kolko and Neumark, 2010).
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place-based policies on the location choice of heterogeneous firms. We
deviate from these papers in a number of ways: First, we compare dif-
ferent channels of place-based policies i.e. wage subsidies, investments
in production amenities and in transportation infrastructure. Second,
we derive the welfare optimal spatial distribution of different types of
place-based transfers for a given tax setting. Third, we determine the
factors that define the optimal place of investment for each type and
show complementarities between different transfer types.6 Simulta-
neous, independent work by Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2019) show
that the efficient, spatial allocation is characterized by a linear relation-
ship between regional expenditure and wages, which can be imple-
mented by a combination of proportional taxes and lump sum
subsidies. This is consistent with our findings for wage subsidies if we
allow the federal government to set the level of taxes far beyond the ob-
served level and abstract from non-local ownership of fixed factors.7
However, we focus on the optimal distribution of wage subsidies for
the observed level of taxes. In that case, wage subsidies are no longer
lump sum but will be shifted to the poor regions since the proportional
tax rate can only be used to a very limited degree to redistribute from
high wage to lowwage regions. Furthermore, we relate to the literature
analyzing investments in transportation infrastructure. Recent papers
by Alder (2016), Fajgelbaum and Schaal (2019) identify the optimal
transportation infrastructure network in trade models. Baum-Snow
et al. (2018) analyze transportation infrastructure investments in
China. Allen and Arkolakis (2016) develop an analytical solution for
how infrastructure investments between neighboring regions impact
trade costs between all other region dyads. We employ this framework
and highlight the interrelations between investments in local transpor-
tation infrastructure and other transfers such as wage subsidies and in-
vestments in local production amenities.
3. Model
Our analysis builds on te framework introduced by Allen and
Arkolakis (2014) and Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) featuring
multiple regions, endogenous agglomeration economies, and a land
marketmitigating the concentration of economic activity. The economy
is endowed with L ¼ ∑nLn workers in total and each worker
inelastically supplies one unit of labor earning a wage wn. Every region
n ∈ N is endowed with an exogenous quality-adjusted supply of land
Hn. Workers have heterogeneous preferences across locations and, in
equilibrium, mobility of workers equalizes indirect utility. Accounting
for idiosyncratic location-specific preferences reducesmobility between
regions.8 Trade between regions i and n is inhibited by iceberg transport
cost dni ≥ 1, where the first subscript refers to the place of consumption.
Themodel allows for unbalanced trade due to regional transfers and re-
gional imbalances in asset holdings. A central government influences
the distribution of economic activity by paying regions wage subsidies
or by investing in local productivity amenities and local transportation
infrastructure. In equilibrium, these three types of transfers are shown
to exert quantitatively important spillovers on neighboring regions via
trade, migration and imbalances in asset holdings. The directions of
spillovers depend on the transfer type. In the following, we lay out the
model details and discuss how regional transfers and federal taxes are
integrated.6 Fiscal equalization of local tax base as studied by Albouy (2012) and Henkel et al.
(2018) leads to regional redistribution but neither affects productivity nor trade costs.
7 In this regard our optimal design of the transfer scheme can be understood as a
second-best scenario for a government being constraint to keeping the tax rates constant.
In order to reach the first-best spatial allocation of a 6.0% welfare gain, a proportional tax
rate of approximately 38.13% would be required, which amounts to about 156 times the
observed level of the tax rate. For the implications of a flexible budget see Section 5.3.
8 Due to the principle of freedom ofmovements forworkers in the EU,we allow formo-
bility across countries. An alternative assumption as in Redding (2012)would restrictmo-
bility to within-country migration.
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Utility of an individual ω residing in n has Cobb-Douglas form
Un ωð Þ ¼ bn ωð Þ Cnα
 α Hn
1−α
 1−α
; ð1Þ
where α ∈ [0,1], Cn represents a composite good, Hn is residential land
use and bn is a location-specific preference shifter, which is drawn for
eachworker independently. The idiosyncratic amenity term bn captures
the idea that workers have heterogeneous preferences for living in each
location.We assume that location preferences are drawn i.i.d. across lo-
cations and workers from a Fréchet distribution with cumulative distri-
bution function
Gn bð Þ ¼ e−Bnb
−ε
; ð2Þ
where the scale parameter Bn determines average amenities for location
n and the shape parameter ε N 1 governs the dispersion of the value of
amenities across workers for each location.
We consider an Armington (1969) setup where the composite con-
sumption good consists of a set of varieties differentiated by the place of
origin. Individuals have constant elasticity of substitution preferences
such that the varieties are aggregated according to
Cn ¼ ∑
i∈N
c
σ−1
σ
ni
0B@
1CA
σ
σ−1
;
ð3Þ
where σ refers to the elasticity of substitution. Maximizing (3) subject
to the budget constraint delivers total demand for a variety of the differ-
entiated good cni ¼
p−σni
P1−σn
αynLn where yn denotes region n‘s per capita
income, Ln is location n‘s labor force, Pn ¼ ð∑i∈Np1−σni Þ
1
1−σ refers to
the price index and pni = pidni is the consumer price for a variety pro-
duced in i and consumed in region n.
The production side is characterized by external economies of scale
where location n‘s productivity depends on local production amenities
~an and the distribution of labor
an ¼ ~anLμn: ð4Þ
Agglomeration elasticity μ ≥ 0 governs the strength of external ag-
glomeration economies arising due to the concentration of population.
Spillovers in this specification are assumed to be external to firms and
entirely local. Every location produces one unique differentiated variety
under perfect competition, which can be traded across regions. Alterna-
tively, agglomeration economies may be imbedded in the spirit of the
new economic geography, which yields qualitatively similar results.
Competitive markets lead to profit maximizing prices pni ¼
dniwi
ai
.
Accordingly, the value of trade flows from region i to n can be stated as
Xni ¼ αynLn
p1−σni
P1−σn
: ð5Þ
Substituting profit-maximizing prices in the demand functions, we
obtain the the fraction of region n‘s expenditure on goods produced in
region if place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
10 Using a standard gravitymodel yields very similar levels of trade costs as shown inA.1.
Thus, our analysis of Tw and Ta is robust to this alternative specification of trade costs. A
comprehensive evaluation of Td requires the specification with endogenous least-cost
path.
11 This constraint implies: γri N κd ⋅ ln (∑nTrd+1)) ∀ {r,i} ∈ Nwhich is always fulfilled
in the data. We also estimated the model using a log-log specification, which, however
was an inferiorfitwith thedata. The adjustment for the number of neighbors assumes that
the sum of transfers Td is invested equally into the travel links to all n neighbors.
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dniwi
ai
 1−σ
∑k∈N
dnkwk
ak
 1−σ ; ð6Þ
as well as the price index in region n
Pn ¼ 1πnn
 1= 1−σð Þdnnwn
an
: ð7Þ
3.2. Trade costs
Infrastructure investments represent one of themain instruments of
European regional policy. Evidently, these investments reduce transpor-
tation costs between two regions that are connected by a newly
established or improved transportation link, say between regions r
and i. Moreover, these investments are expected to impact trade costs
for any other region pair for which the new link is located on the
least-cost path. While these groups of beneficiaries can in principle be
identified, the least-cost path itself is likely to be endogenous, which
complicates the analysis. Therefore, we employ a framework recently
developed by Allen and Arkolakis (2016), which assigns a certain prob-
ability for a good shipped between two regions that it passes any other
region. The idea is that shipments are carried out by a continuum of
traders with idiosyncratic costs for different routes. Accordingly, there
is a non-zero probability that shipments between two regions pass
any transportation link.
We refer to a transportation link as the direct connection between
two adjacent regions r, i, which incurs direct iceberg trade costs ~dri. For
elements representing non-adjacent region pairs n and i it is assumed
that ~dni ¼ ∞. In particular, we specify direct trade costs as a function of
road travel time TravelTimeri between adjacent regions:
~dri ¼ eβTravelTimeri : ð8Þ
Direct trade costs enter the weighted adjacency matrix ~D ¼ ½~d−θri .
The aggregate trade costs for shipping a good across non-adjacent loca-
tions n, i are given by the product of direct trade costs along the chosen
path. We assume that path-specific trade-costs shocks occur and that
traders choose the path by minimizing trade costs. In this setting,
Allen and Arkolakis (2016) derive the expected trade costs from n to i
as:
dni ¼ Γ
θ−1
θ
 
f nið Þ
−
1
θ ; ð9Þ
where θ N 0 denotes the shape parameter of the Fréchet distributed
trade-cost shocks and Γ the gamma distribution. Variable fni refers to
the (n,i) element of the route cost matrix F, which, as long as the spec-
tral radius of ~D is less than one, can be expressed as: F ≡∑∞K¼0 ~D
K
ni
¼ ðI−~DÞ−1.9 Due to path-specific shocks, which can also be interpreted
as idiosyncratic tastes, trade between two regions can follow any route,
including the most indirect ones with a certain probability. However,
the probability of passing a certain link decreases with the costs of the
detour that arises from the deviation from the least-cost route that
would be applicable without shocks. A transport investment at link ri
is more relevant for trade between region pairs having their least-cost
route in the proximity of ri and accordingly pass the link more9 The spectral radius is less than one, if either trade costs between connected locations
are sufficiently large, the adjacency matrix is sufficiently sparse, or the heterogeneity
across traders is sufficiently small. In our application, this is fulfilled. See Allen and
Arkolakis (2016) and Appendix A.1 for more details.
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distant from link ri. In the following, we estimate the effect of transport
investments on travel time between adjacent regions,which impacts di-
rect trade costs ~dri according to (8) and affects expected trade costs be-
tween all other regions according to (9).10
In summary,we can reproduce the effect of a local transport-time re-
duction at any link ri for the aggregate European transport network.
Such amodification of the transport network triggered by a local invest-
mentmay result in a new spatial equilibriumwith substantial relocation
of economic activity far beyond the one explained by the direct effect on
link ri.
3.3. Regional and federal government
The national governments levy labor income taxes (τn), which are
transferred to the federal budget and used tofinance aggregate transfers
Tn = Tnw + Tna + Tnd. Reflecting the most important components of
European regional policy, we consider local wage subsidies
Tn
w, investments in local production amenities Tna and investments in
local transportation infrastructure Tnd –which reduce travel time across
direct links. Thus, the government budget constraint is given by:X
n∈N
wnLnτn ¼
X
n∈N
Tn: ð10Þ
Public investments in roads between regions n and i reduce
TravelTimeri(Tid,Trd) entering (8). In particular, we specify the following
relationship:
TravelTimeri ¼ γri−κd  ln Tdr þ Tdi þ 1
 
; ð11Þ
where TravelTimeri is constrained to positive values and Tnd is adjusted by
the number of n′s neighbors.11 These public investments reduce the
travel time between all direct links, which again feeds back to expected
trade costs across adjacent and non-adjacent regions according to
Section 3.2. We assume that investments in public transportation are
non-rival given that the average road is not congested.12
A further channel of regional transfers concerns R&D activities, uni-
versities, broadband internet access, energy supply, etc., which we as-
sume to impact local productivity. Hence, we introduce public
investments in local production amenities rendering regional technol-
ogy endogenous:
ln ~anð Þ ¼ ln anð Þ þ κa  ln Tan=Ln þ 1
 
: ð12Þ
Again a region specific level of productivity for a counterfactual situ-
ation without transfers an is empirically obtained using detailed data
about regional transfers.13
We model the effects of transfers on transportation infrastructure
(Tnd) and on production amenities (Tna) in a simple way and assume
that it is produced using a specific factor of elastic supply (e.g. concrete),
which cannot be used for other purposes and is owned by all individuals
equally. Government coordination is necessary to translate this factor
into transportation infrastructure and production amenities. Therefore,n
12 A varying degree of rivalry is incorporated in an earlier version,which is, however, not
supported by the data. A further alternative includes complementarities of investments at
the two nodes of a link. While these are empirically significant, our main results remain
unaffected.
13 Empirical model-selection analysis yields the best fit for a log-log specification.
f place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
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government demand determines the quantity sold. The input
factor can be freely shipped across regions. Without loss of
generality, we assume that the price of this factor equals unity
such that the government buys Td and Ta units when it invests in infra-
structure and production amenities.14 Equal ownership of the
factor allows us to clearly differentiate between wage subsidies
Tn
w, which directly increase income only in region n on the one hand,
and Tnd, Tna on the other handwhere the direct income from investments
is distributed equally but the effects through transportation costs and
productivity are localized. The simplifying assumption of a uniform
price of the input factor can be justified by construction firms operating
at a multi-regional level. In Appendix D.3, we discuss an extension with
infrastructure being built using exclusively local factors, which leads to
region-specific prices in the transfer function.
Taxes in our model are locally distortive in the sense that higher
labor taxes make a location less attractive for labor supply, but the tax
has no effect on global labor supply. Note that inefficiencies of the public
sector on the expenditure side are captured by the empirical estimates
of κa and κd. Thus, we refrain from incorporating an excess burden of
taxation. This would only affect the optimal size of the public sector
and would not have immediate consequences for the spatial distribu-
tion of public spending, which is the focus of this paper.
3.4. Regional income
Regional per capita income yn stems from after-tax wages wn(1 −
τn), per capita subsidies Tnw/Ln, rent income (1 − ιn)Hnrn/Ln and per
capita payments from a global portfolio χ. We denote the tax rate by
τn and the rent per unit of land by rn.15 As in Caliendo et al. (2018)
and Monte et al. (2018), we assume that land is owned by locals and
non-locals. Hence, individuals contribute a share ιn ∈ [0,1] of land
rents to a global portfolio, which redistributes rents as well as income
from the factor producing transportation infrastructure and production
amenities back to them in the form of a per-capita paymentχ. Thereby,
we allow for trade deficits across regions, which is empirically relevant
and particularly important in the context of place-based policy. For in-
stance, regional transfers are likely to capitalize in local asset values,
which benefit not only local residents but any asset holders in the recip-
ient regions. Note that even with balanced asset holdings, trade imbal-
ances apply in our model due to regional transfers. However, without
taking into account imbalances in asset holdings, we may overestimate
the effect of transfers on trade imbalances. Aggregate regional income
amounts to
ynLn ¼ wnLn 1−τnð Þ þ Twn þ 1−ιnð ÞHnrn þ χLn; ð13Þ
where Tnw denotes the public wage transfers. Per capita payments accru-
ing from the rent portfolio and from the production of infrastructure
and production amenities can be expressed as χ ¼ ð1=LÞ∑n∈NðιnHnrn
þTdn þ TanÞ.16 The difference between tax payments, rental contributions
to the global portfolio and the revenue out of it generates imbalances in
trade accounts. Regions displaying a higher value of ιn than the average
are characterized by a trade surplus. Trade balance may be stated as
ϒn ≡ ιnHnrn þ τnwnLn−χLn−Twn : ð14Þ14 In Section 4, we describe the estimation of the elasticities κa, κd and the pre-
investment levels ~an; TravelTimeri and show that these are independent of the price as-
sumed for the input factor.
15 Our results are robust to taxing aggregate income instead of wages.
16 Regional income is composed of the sum of wage payments, net rental payments, net
wage transfers, and net payments for the ownership of the infrastructure-specific factor.
The latter two balance out in total/global GDP.
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w
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 	
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3.5. Residential choice
Using the above expressions for rental rate and price index (7) we
obtain real income
yn
Pαn r1−αn
¼ η anyn
dnnwn
 α
πnnð Þα= 1−σð Þ HnLn
 1−α
; ð16Þ
where η ¼ 1
1−α
ð1−αÞ
. Indirect utility of an individual in region n de-
pends on real income and a stochastic amenity term at the place of res-
idence VnðωÞ ¼ bnðωÞ ynPαn r1−αn
. Since consumption amenities follow a
Fréchet distribution and indirect utility is a transformation of the ran-
dom amenity draw, the cumulative distribution function of indirect util-
ity is given by GnðVÞ ¼ e
−Bnð
yn
Pαn r1−αn
Þ
ε
V−ε
. The probability that an
individual prefers locations n over all other locations corresponds to
the share of region n‘s population. Using the above distributions, the
share of population in location n corresponds to
λn ¼ Pr Vn≥ max Vkf g;∀ k∈Nð Þ ¼
Bn
yn
Pαn r1−αn
 ε
X
k∈N
Bk
yk
Pαk r
1−α
k
 !ε ; ð17Þ
where λn ¼ Ln∑k∈NLk
. A high value of ε implies that the location-specific
amenity draws are less dispersed. As a result, locations become better
substitutes and an increase in the relative appeal of a location (i.e. in-
crease in real wage) leads to a larger response in the fraction of workers
who choose to locate there. In an extreme case of no location taste het-
erogeneity (ε → ∞), workers are not attached to specific locations such
that the supply of labor becomes perfectly elastic.
From the cumulative distribution Gn(V) follows that expected indi-
rect utility of an individual living in n is given by
E Vn½  ¼ V ¼ δ ∑
k∈N
Bk
yk
Pαk r
1−α
k
 !ε" #1
ε
; ð18Þ
where δ ¼ Γðε−1
ε
Þ is a constant term and Γ() refers to the Gamma func-
tion. Population mobility implies that the expected indirect utility of an
individual has to be identical across all potential destinations such that,
in equilibrium, locations are chosen optimally. Further substituting pop-
ulation share (17), we obtain:
V ¼ δ Bnð Þ
1
ε
yn
Pαn r1−αn
 
1
λn
 1
ε
:
ð19Þ
If certain locations provide more utility than others, workers move
to the place, which offers the highest possible utility. Hence, an increase
in nominal wages is ceteris paribus accompanied by an increase in local
population share. Moreover, due to agglomeration benefits, larger mar-
kets are more productive and pay higher wages. However, an inflow of
population bids up land prices, which acts as a dispersion force andf place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
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must dominate agglomeration forces in equilibrium. This leads to the
following parameter restriction (1 − α) + 1/ε N αμ and rules out that
the whole population is located in one region.17
3.6. General equilibrium
Given the set of parameters {σ,μ,α,ε,ιn}, the general equilibrium can
be expressed by themarket clearing conditions on goods and labormar-
kets, the government budget constraint, and the migration equilibrium
condition.Market clearing on the goodsmarket requires that location i‘s
labor income is equal to the total expenditure for the goods produced in
that location:
wnλn ¼ α
X
k∈N
πknλkyk; ð20Þ
where per-capita income is given by (15). Labormarket clearing follows
from (6) and the location choice probabilities (17) jointly with real in-
come in (16) close the model. With 264 NUTS2 regions, this yields a
total of 70,488 equilibrium conditions.18 Based on these conditions
and data for {λn,yn,Hn,dni,Tnw,Tna,Tnd,τn}, we can recover the endogenous
outcomes {an,πni,Bn,wn}. All other endogenous variables can be
expressed in terms of these recovered variables and the exogenous var-
iables. Note that for the counterfactual welfare analyses, we apply the
exact hat algebra introduced by Dekle et al. (2007) such that the levels
of location attractiveness (Bn) are not needed.
4. Estimation & calibration
As it is evident from the maps in Fig. 1, our data covers almost all
NUTS2 regions in the EU27.19 The EU administers its place-based poli-
cies according to multi-annual budgeting periods. We fit the model to
data for the three most recent budgeting periods, 1994–99, 2000–06
and 2007–13 in order to explore the validity of our model and to obtain
time variation in local production amenities. For the analysis of counter-
factuals, we focus on the most recent budgeting period, 2007–13. In
total, we observe data for 264 European NUTS2 regions, which were el-
igible for EU transfers in the most recent period. Summary statistics of
all our exogenous variables are reported in Table A.3, and Fig. 1 illus-
trates the spatial distribution of these variables.
Regional transfers: The EU Commission provides detailed informa-
tion on regional transfers for all three budgeting periods. The data
covers regional expenditures fromall three sources of regional transfers,
the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund as
well as for the Cohesion Fund. The transfers are classified according to
12 spending categories, which we assign to the respective transfer
types.20 This assignment bases on the descriptions of representative
projects financed via the respective categories. The allocation of transfer
types is consistent with an empirical analysis exploring the significance
of each transfer category for the respective outcome, i.e. travel time and
local production amenities. In total, 37% of transfers were invested in
production amenities, 34% in improvements of transportation infra-
structure and 29% were channeled through wage subsidies.17 For a detailed discussion see Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017) and Eq. (23) below.
18 Our system of equation has 264 × 264 bilateral trade shares according to (6) and 264
location choice probabilities (17), 264 equations for per-capita income (15) as well as 264
goods market clearing conditions (20), which sum up to 70,488 equations.
19 Due to missing data our analysis excludes the remote islands Madeira (PT30), Açores
(PT20), Canary Islands (ES70) and the French overseas territories (FR91, FR92, FR93,
FR94).
20 The categories are: 1) Energy, 2) Environment & natural resources, 3) Human re-
sources, 4) IT infrastructure & services, 5) Research & Technology, 6) Business support,
7) Social infrastructure, 8) Technical assistance, 9) Tourism & Culture, 10) Urban & rural
regeneration, 11) Transport infrastructure, 12) Other. We assign categories 1–5 to trans-
fers in local production amenities (Tna), category 11 to transfers in transport infrastructure
(Tnd), and 6–10 to wage subsidies (Tnw).
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and place-based subsidies are strongly tied to regional economic devel-
opment as well as political bargaining (e.g. Charron, 2016). The highest
transfer intensities were observed in the Southern and Eastern periph-
ery of the EU as shown in panel a) of Fig. 1. Notably, virtually all regions
received a positive transfer from the central EU government. Yet, there
is a substantial variation as total per capita transfers (Tn/Ln) ranged be-
tween 34 Cents and 892 Euros. The relative distribution of transfer
types (TnwTn, TnaTn, TndTn) across regions varies quite significantly as is
shown in Table 5 and Figs. A.3 in the Appendix.
Population shares and regional income: Cambridge Econometrics'
European Regional Database provides information on population, em-
ployment, and per capita income for every NUTS2 region and the
whole time period. Since themodel assumes full employment, our sim-
ulations use employment data for Ln as well as for the shares (λn).21 Per
capita income (yn) is measured in 2005 constant Euros. Fig. 1 illustrates
the spatial distribution of per capita income and population shares.
Residential land supply: Information about residential land-use
stems from the dataset “Ecosystem types of Europe” published by the
European Environment Agency. This data provides habitat information
for 100x100m cells. For residential land-use (Hn), we sum up all con-
structed, industrial and other artificial habitats for every NUTS2 region.
Regional levels of Hn are shown in panel d) of Fig. 1.
Price of land and contributions to global portfolio: We compute the
price of the immobile factor – land – using the condition rn = (1− α)
Lnyn/Hn jointly with data on regional per capita income (yn), population
(Ln) and residential supply of land (Hn) as described above. For the
consumer's expenditure share in goods consumption we follow
Eurostat (2016) and assume α = 0.75.
The trade balance is calculated by calibrating each region's share of
the immobile sector paid into the international portfolio ιn. We solve
for ιn by minimizing the sum of squared errors between the observed
trade balance ϒnData and the model's trade balance as defined in (14):
min
ιn
X
n∈N
ϒDatan þ Twn −τnwnLn−ιnHnrn þ χLn
 2
: ð21Þ
Data for annual trade balance ϒnData stems from Eurostat and is only
available at the country level. To obtain region n‘s trade balance, we
weigh the country's trade balance by regional GDP. Fig. A.2 in Appendix
A illustrates the close fit between the data and the model's trade bal-
ance, where the correlation coefficient is 0.993.
Wages:We obtain region n‘swageswn by substituting income,wage
transfers and payments from the international portfolio into Eq. (15). In
ourmain analysis, we set tax rates (τn) constant across regions and thus
tax revenue proportional to regional wages. This is legitimate as the two
main sources of the EU budget are proportional to local income. By far
the most important part of a country's contribution to the EU budget
bases on a uniform rate applied to the gross national income (GNI) of
each member state. In 2012, the EU-27 countries contributed 86.8% to
the EU budget according to their GNI based valuation. The second
most important component refers to contributions according to a har-
monized VAT of 0.3%. The value added tax contributed about 13.1% to
the total budget and the remaining difference is accounted for by cor-
rection mechanisms.22 Tax rates τn = τ are obtained from the govern-
ment budget constraint (10) equating transfer expenditure and total
tax revenue:
τ
X
n∈N
wnLn ¼
X
n∈N
Tn: ð22Þ21 Note that all results are robust to using population data instead.
22 Information about specific contributions to the regional policy budget is not available.
Yet, the EU discloses countries' payments to the overall budget, which are a constant pro-
portion of countries' GDP. In contrast, the ratio of regional transfers to local GDP (at NUTS2
level) ranged from 0.0004% (London) to 4.6% (Hungary, Northern Great Plain).
f place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
Fig. 1. Overview of observed variables. Notes: The figures depict quantiles of the reported variables. A darker shading in the map indicates a higher value.
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butions to the EU budget and set taxes equal to country-specific tax
rates τn = τc, which are proxied by the national contribution divided
by GNI. In this case, we introduce a scaling parameter ν to ensure that
the government budget constraint is fulfilled i.e., ν∑n∈NwnLnτc =
∑n∈NTn.
Transportation costs:We use Eq. (9) and information on TravelTimeri
together with parameter estimates for θ and β to obtain expected trans-
portation costs (dni). UsingGIS software, we identify adjacent NUTS2 re-
gions and compute the elements of the adjacency matrix (~D) based on
road TravelTimeri between the centroids of the respective regions,
which is provided by the RRG Database. The latter contains detailed in-
formation on different speed limits, slope gradients, congestion etc.2323 Note that we assume regionsmaintaining a ferry connection to be adjacent in order to
ensure a comprehensive transport network and trade between the EU continent and the
islands. Information about ferry connections is obtained from openstreetmap.org.
Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design o
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319TravelTimeri is measured in hours travelled on roads in the years 1999,
2006, and 2013 for the respective periods. By minimizing the sum of
squared errors between observed freight and gravity Eq. (5), we esti-
mate the factor converting travel time to trade cost β. For this, we
need data on bilateral road freight among NUTS2 regions and set pa-
rameter values for the trade elasticity σ = 5 and heterogeneity of
traders θ=136.13. The former stems from the European Transport Pol-
icy Information System for the year 2010 andwe parameterize the elas-
ticity of substitution (σ) and trade heterogeneity (θ) according to
estimations obtained by Simonovska and Waugh (2014) and Allen
and Arkolakis (2016).
The non-linear least square estimates of our gravity equation yield a
value of β=0.068. Fig. A.1 in the Appendix depicts a strong correlation
of −0.709 between demeaned freight data and trade costs with esti-
mated β. Our estimate is slightly higher than the one obtained by
Allen and Arkolakis (2016), which is likely due to differences inf place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
Table 1
Estimation and calibration of parameters.
Description Par. Value Reference
Elasticity of prod. amenities κa 0.006 Estimation in Table A.1
Elasticity of transport
infrastructure
κd 0.004 Estimation in Table A.1
Share of consumption expenditure α 0.75 Eurostat (2016)
Elasticity of substitution σ 5 Simonovska and Waugh
(2014)
Agglomeration elasticity μ 0.1 Estimation in Table A.1
Heterogeneity of preferences ε 3 Estimation in Table A.1
Factor converting TravelTimeri to
~dri
β 0.068 Estimation in Section A.1
Heterogeneity of traders θ 136.13 Allen and Arkolakis (2016)
Notes: The table reports estimated and calibrated parameters entering our model. The
elasticity of substitution is within the range of common values in the literature and equiv-
alent to Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017).
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more detailed discussion of the estimation of β.
Recovering location fundamentals and estimating elasticities {ε,μ}:
We recover regional productivity by substituting (6) in goods market
clearing (20). Given data for {λn,yn} and substituting parameters
{σ,α}, estimates of dni as well as the already recovered information
aboutwnwe obtain an; ~an and consequently equilibrium values for bilat-
eral trade shares and real income (see Appendix A.5 for details). Recall
that we invert the model for the last three programming periods such
that we obtain a panel of the model's equilibrium values.
The shape parameter of the Fréchet distribution of location prefer-
ences can be estimated from a log-linearized version of (17). The de-
nominator of this equation is constant across all regions. By including
region-specific fixed effects in the empirical specification, we absorb
time-invariant components of ln(Bn) such that we obtain ε as the coef-
ficient on region- and time-specific real income. However, estimating
(17) is complicated by the simultaneous relationship between real in-
come and local employment. As is common in the literature, we resort
to a Bartik type instrument, which is constructed by pre-determined
sector shares across regions and growth dynamics of the sectors at an
aggregate level (e.g. Bartik, 1991; Diamond, 2016). In particular, we
use the sectoral employment shares of NUTS2 regions in the year
1985 and interact them with the growth rates at the EU level. As an al-
ternative instrument, we use the geographical centrality of a region,
which affects real income via the price index but does not have a direct
effect on population shares. Our estimates yield values between 2.9 and
3.5 and thus we set ε = 3, which is in line with Bryan and Morten
(2019), Monte et al. (2018), and Redding and Rossi-Hansberg (2017).
Having specified ε, we substitute real income from (16) in popula-
tion shares (17) and solve for regional consumption amenities Bn (see
Appendix A.6 for details).
We obtain the agglomeration elasticity μ by estimating Eq. (4) for
the panel of regional productivities jointly with data on regional em-
ployment for the corresponding years. Importantly, OLS estimates of
(4) yield biased estimates because the model implies that higher local
productivity reflects in higher wages and an inflow of population.
Combes et al. (2010) propose to use information about the nature of
soils in a region as an instrument for population density. The relevance
of the instrument builds on the idea that some types of soils are more
suitable to support a higher population density and more fertile soil
has historically attracted a greater number of people. Since soil quality
is no longer a relevant factor for productivity, it is a valid instrument
to identify the effect of Ln and productivity.We compute regional soil in-
dices at the NUTS2 level based on raster data provided by the European
Soil Data Centre. Specifically, we follow Combes et al. (2010) and com-
pute indices for Depth to rock as well as for the Topsoil mineralogy. As is
shown in Appendix A.3 both instruments turn out relevant in the first
stage of the instrumental variable estimation and the instruments pass
the Sargan test for overidentification. We estimate in our preferred
specification an agglomeration elasticity of about μ = 0.1, which is
well in line with Allen and Arkolakis (2014) and somewhat below the
estimates obtained by Brülhart and Mathys (2008) based on a dynamic
GMM estimation for European NUTS2 regions.
Transfer elasticity of production amenities and travel time: The
transfer elasticities are estimated based on fixed effects regressions
and regression discontinuity design (RDD) specifications of (11) and
(12). In the latter case, we exploit the fact that a substantial share of re-
gional transfers (so-called Objective 1 transfers) are paid according to
an allocation rule that gives rise to a discontinuity: Regions are eligible
for the highest transfer intensity if their per capita GDP falls below
75% of the EU average in somewell defined years prior to the respective24 First, trade and geographic barriers might be higher in Europe than in the US, which
results in a higher factor converting travel time to trade costs. Second, transportation links
are shorter for NUTS2 regions than for major cities located at the US Interstate Highway
System as considered in Allen and Arkolakis (2016).
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using data for all three budgeting periods. Accordingly, we employ the
panel of recovered production amenities for 1994–99, 2000–06, 2007–
13 and data for road travel times in these years for estimation of κa
and κd, respectively. This allows us to exploit changes in transfer inten-
sities over time in addition to the cross-sectional variation and thus to
improve the causal identification of transfer elasticities. Note thatwe in-
clude time-fixed effects in all specifications. The benchmark results for
the estimates of both transfer elasticities are displayed in Table A.1 in
Appendix A.2. It is evident that higher regional transfer intensities in-
crease production amenities and decrease road travel time. Moreover,
the effects are highly significant across specifications. For our quantita-
tive analysis, we use the fixed-effect estimates (κa = 0.006 and κd =
0.004) noting that the confidence bounds are overlapping with the
RDD estimates at conventional levels of statistical significance.25 These
point estimates imply that a 1% increase in per-capita transfers raises
production amenities by about 0.006 percent by the end of the seven
year period. A 1% increase in transfers to a transportation link yields a
reduction of about 0.004 hours (equivalent to ca. 0.2 percent of the av-
erage travel time between links) at the end of the respective budgeting
period. We use the estimated parameter κd jointly with data about link-
specific travel time and transfers to compute γri according to Eq. (11).
Analogously we obtain the fundamental location amenities an from
Eq. (12) using the estimates for κa. The regression constants absorb
the uniform price of the factor producing infrastructure and production
amenities because of the logarithmic specification. Accordingly, our es-
timates allow us to quantify the percentage changes of TravelTimeri and
lnð~anÞ for any percentage change in transfers independent of the input
factor's price.
Table 1 provides information on all parameters entering our model.
We performed sensitivity checks for the parameters set according to the
literature and conclude that our qualitative results are robust to the
choice of parameters within the usual range reported in the literature.
An overview of our recovered variables is depicted in Fig. 2. A number
of observations stand out: First, wages are lowest in the east and
south of Europe, whereas production amenities are highest in the core
as well as in Scandinavia and generally in cities. Eastern Europe shows
low production amenities both net of transfers and once the EU invest-
ments are accounted for. Second, land rents are evidently highest in cit-
ies and tend to be relatively high in the UK, Northern Italy and Southern
Germany compared to areas with low land prices in Central and Eastern
Europe. Third, Germany and Eastern Europe display a high share of con-
tributions to the global portfolio indicating a trade surplus while low
shares of global investments in France, Greece and Portugal result in a
trade deficit. Fourth, consumption amenities are highest in Eastern25 Note that the elasticities for production amenities and travel time are not directly
comparablewith prior estimates in the literature focusing onGDP or employment growth.
f place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
Fig. 2. Overview of estimated and recovered variables. Notes: The figures depict quantiles of the reported variables. A darker shading in the map indicates a higher value.
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26 According to European Commission (2014) the internationalmigration within the EU
amounted to about 1.2% of the working age population.
27 These countries are BG, CZ, EE, HU, LT, LV, MT, PL, RO, SK. The share of population of
these 10 countries in the total European population is currently about 18.83%.
28 Note that the aggregate welfare effect is not equivalent to adding the individual com-
ponents in panels a), b), and c) because the individual transfers enter non-linearly. For in-
stance, investment in transportation infrastructure and production amenities are
complementary.
29 The EUCommission verifies eachmember state's compliancewith this principle at the
mid-term of each programming period (European Commissions, 1996).
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such as Paris, London, andMadrid. This captures on the one hand utility
benefits conditional on real income and on the other hand regional mi-
gration costs. Fifth, the price index strongly correlates with the geo-
graphical market access as measured by the sum of trade costs. These
patterns are well in line with stylized facts about economic geography
in Europe and suggest that the model performs well in matching the
distribution of economic activity.
5. Counterfactual analysis
We derive counterfactual changes in wages, trade shares and popu-
lation shares which provide – jointly with direct effects of transfers on
production amenities, trade costs, and income – sufficient statistics of
thewelfare effects of regional policy. A counterfactual change is denoted
as x̂ ¼ x
0
x
, where x is the observed variable and x′ is theunobserved coun-
terfactual value of x. In the counterfactual simulations, transfers enter in
three ways: First, transfers influence the equilibrium via nominal wage
subsidies raising income (ŷn). Second, transfers impact transportation
costs and thereby alter trade costs (d̂ni) as well as regions' market ac-
cess. Third, investments in production amenities proportionately raise
production amenities (b~an), which reduce prices of varieties produced
in recipient regions. According to expected utility (19) the change in
welfare across regions is given by:
bV ¼ 1
π̂nn
  α
σ−1 ŷnb~an
ŵnd̂nn
 !α
λ̂n
 αμ− 1−αð Þ−1=ε
: ð23Þ
From this equation, it is evident that a full cost-benefit analysis
should not only consider direct effects of transfers (ŷn;b~an; d̂nn) in the re-
cipient region but also account for changes in trade share, population
and local wages. These changes are derived from the full system of
counterfactual equilibrium equations shown in Appendix B.
We isolate effects of different transfer mechanisms by studying
three counterfactual situations: First, we analyze the effect of
abandoning EU regional transfers altogether and set the corresponding
tax rates to zero. The resulting outcome provides a welfare measure of
EU regional policy. In a second counterfactual analysis, we show how
the spatial equilibrium would change if transfers were distributed
equally. In this case, the level of transfers is comparable to the observed
one, in total and for each type. Hence, this counterfactual informs about
how efficient the EU distributes transfers compared to a naive rule that
gives every region the same. Third, we derive the optimal spatial alloca-
tion of transfers for each type of transfer separately aswell as for the sum
of transfer channels. This allows us to quantify potential efficiency gains
from redistribution and to derive the factors that render a type of transfer
efficient in some regions and inefficient in others. In these simulations,
we keep tax rates and the aggregate mix of transfer types in Europe at
the observed levels such that the optimality criterion focuses on the spa-
tial distribution of transfers rather than the size of the program.
5.1. No-transfer scenario
What would be the (welfare) effects if the European Union aban-
doned its place-based policy scheme altogether? To analyze this ques-
tion, we set both transfers and tax rates to zero.
Expectedly, we find that productivity and income losses would be
most pronounced in Southern and Eastern Europe where the per capita
transfers are the highest. The change in transportation costs due to
suspending transfers would generally be most pronounced in periph-
eral regions in the south, east and north of Europe. These direct effects
would translate into changes inwages, own trade shares and population
shares. In particular, our simulation suggests that substantially more
workers would relocate from Southern and Eastern European regionsPlease cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design o
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319to the Center and North of Europe. The increase of inter-regional migra-
tion would amount to 0.68 percent of the European population.26 Fig.
B.1 in the Appendix illustrates the changes predicted by the model for
the no-transfer scenario.
Overall, the ten countries with the highest share of population emi-
grating would lose about 2.65% of their population when moving from
the observed equilibrium to a situation without transfers.27 At the
same time, average nominal per capita income in the regions of these
ten countries would be about 1.51% lower than in the observed equilib-
rium. Accordingly, our findings suggest that EU regional transfers were
quite effective in reducing migration from new member states in the
east to the center. On average, abolishing transfers would also signifi-
cantly increase average own trade shares by 3.05%. Summing up over
allwelfare components,we find that the EUplace-based transfers raised
welfare by approximately 2.08% compared to the no-transfer scenario.
How did the individual types of transfers contribute to the welfare
gain and to changes in regional inequality? In Table 2, we summarize
the effects of individual transfer types on welfare and regional inequal-
ity asmeasured by the coefficient of variation. Panel a) isolates thewage
subsidies as one mechanism of regional transfers, panels b) and
c) isolate the effects via production amenity gains and changes in trans-
portation costs while panel d) considers all three transfer channels
simultaneously.28 In column (2), we report the change in welfare and
inequality obtained with the observed spatial distribution of transfers
relative to the counterfactual without transfers. Assuming that produc-
tivity and transportation costs remain unaffected by transfers, we find
that the observed distribution of wage subsidies raised welfare by 0.05
percent. Reductions in regional inequality concern the second objective
of regional policy. In this regard, it turns out that the observed distribu-
tion of wage subsidies has in fact significantly reduced inequality in
terms of nominal income aswell as real income. Analogously, assuming
that the only direct effect of transfers is to raise local productivity, we
find that the welfare gain due to the observed allocation of transfers
amounts to 1.21 percent. A significant reduction in inequality is ob-
tained as the production enhancing effects of transfers are concentrated
in poor and peripheral regions. Finally, panel c) of Table 2 isolates the ef-
fects of transport infrastructure investments. Transport infrastructure
represents not only a major part of expenditure but also contributed
to the second-largest welfare gain, which amounts to about 0.82 per-
cent. However, transportation infrastructure investments have only
contributed to a relatively small reduction in regional inequality in
terms of nominal and real income.
Considering the total effect of transfers via all three channels
(Table 2d), we obtain a significant increase in welfare and a substantial
reduction in regional inequality compared to the no-transfer scenario.
These results are based on the assumption that local governments
would not step in for the EU's investments. This is grounded in the EU
Structural Funds' ‘additionality principle’, which stipulates that trans-
fers must not replace public expenditures of the member states.29 An-
other caveat about the level effect of investments in infrastructure and
production amenities is that the input factor is not drawn from other
economic activities. From these observations follows that the level ef-
fect may contain an upward bias.f place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
Table 2
Welfare and inequality effects of transfers.
(a) Wage subsidies (Tnw) (b) Production amenities (Tna)
Equal Observed Optimal Equal Observed Optimal
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Welfare (V̂n) 0.02% 0.05% 0.20% 1.55% 1.21% 1.69%cCVðynÞ −0.18% −0.34% −0.51% −0.24% −0.82% −0.00%cCVðynPαn r1−αn Þ −0.12% −0.25% −0.35% −0.09% −0.66% 0.01%
(c) Transportation infrastructure (Tnd) (d) All transfers (Tn)
Equal Observed Optimal Equal Observed Optimal
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Welfare (V̂n) 1.19% 0.82% 1.22% 2.60% 2.08% 3.14%cCVðynÞ 0.04% −0.07% 0.05% −0.18% −1.22% −0.44%cCVðynPαn r1−αn Þ 0.11% −0.17% 0.16% 0.04% −1.06% −0.17%
Notes: The table compares outcomes relative to the no-transfer equilibrium. Columns 1 refer to an equal distribution of per capita transfers, columns 2 refer to the observed distribution of
transfers, and columns 3 refer to the optimal distribution of total transfers (panel d) and individual transfer types (panels a, b, c). Panel a) considers transfer effects only viawage subsidies,
panel b) considers transfer effects only via production amenities and panel c) considers only effects via investments in transport infrastructure. The first line shows thewelfare changes in
general equilibrium. Lines 2 to 3 show the changes in regional inequality as measured by the coefficient of variation (CV). In all counterfactual experiments we keep tax rates constant at
the observed level. When we restrict the analysis to one transfer type we keep taxes at the level required to finance the observed budget of the respective transfer type.
31 Instead of a uniform distribution of investments, one may also consider a uniform, lo-
cal, proportional tax rate,which is invested locally. This yields higher levels of investments
in rich versus poor regions. While this setup conflicts with the EU's additionality principle
and excludeswage subsidies, the aggregate welfare effects would be between the uniform
and the optimal distribution.
32 The routine proceeds as follows: First, we draw random initial values for transfer
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Another natural candidate for a policy experiment is to fix tax rates
and distribute the government budget uniformly across regions. This
naive distribution allows us to isolate thewelfare implications of the re-
gional distribution of transfers while keeping the level of taxes – re-
quired to finance the respective transfer type – and total expenditures
for each type constant.
The consequences for welfare and regional inequality of this ex-
periment are reported in column (1) of Table 2, where the effects
are generally expressed relative to the no-transfer scenario. The
counterfactual changes in local outcomes are depicted in Fig. B.2 in
the Appendix. Moving from the observed to a uniform distribution
of transfers, our model predicts significant immigration from Eastern
and Southern Europe to the core and northern parts of Europe. Yet,
the migration response would be less pronounced than in the case
without transfers as the ten countries with the highest emigration
would lose only about 2.17% of their population compared to the ob-
served equilibrium. The reduction in nominal per capita income
across regions in these countries would be about 1.38% compared
to the observed equilibrium.
Looking at the different transfer types separately, we find that
with regard to wage subsidies the existing distribution is more effi-
cient than a uniform distribution as is evident from Table 2a. The
welfare effect of the observed distribution of wage subsidies is
more than twice the effect of a uniform distribution and inequality
is notably lower.30 A uniform distributionwould allocatemore trans-
fers to the center and thereby reach a welfare increase of 0.34 per-
centage points via the production amenity channel (Table 2b) and
0.37 percentage points via the transportation infrastructure channel
(Table 2c) compared to the welfare gain of the observed distribution.
Summing up over all transfer types, the uniform distribution domi-
nates the observed one from an aggregate welfare perspective: We
estimate an increase in welfare of about 0.52 percentage points
whenmoving from the observed to the uniform distribution of trans-
fers (Table 2d). Overall, the comparison of columns (1) and (2) in
Table 2 illustrates that the existing distribution goes further in reduc-
ing regional income inequalities than a uniform distribution but at30 Note that the uniform distribution already implies a certain redistribution from high
to low income regions due to proportional taxes.
Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design o
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319the costs of lower efficiency obtained via investments in production
amenities and transportation infrastructure.315.3. Optimal distribution of transfers
From a policy maker's point of view, a crucial question is whether
there are efficiency gains that can be reached by changing the distribu-
tion of transfers across regions while keeping the aggregate shares
spent on each transfer type as well as the tax rates (i.e. the program
budget) constant. Tomaximize aggregatewelfare, we use a “Mathemat-
ical Programming With Equilibrium Constraints” (MPEC) approach as
introduced by Su and Judd (2012) and applied by Ossa (2014, 2017)
for optimal tariffs and subsidies. This numerical optimization routine
maximizes regions' welfare and uses themodel's equilibrium equations
as constraints.32
We derive the optimal distribution of transfers for each type sepa-
rately and report the corresponding optimal welfare changes and im-
pacts on regional inequality in columns (3) of Table 2. Fig. 3 shows the
shares of the transfer budgets a region should receive according to the
welfare optimizing algorithm. From Fig. 3a it is evident that the optimal
distribution of wage subsidies deviates significantly from the observed
one. In particular, the welfare optimal policy issues transfers to only a
few regions in Eastern Europe while cutting subsidies in most other re-
cipient regions. A redistribution of wage subsidies according to our op-
timal allocation yields a welfare gain of 0.20 percent compared to the
no-transfer scenario, which is four times the gain achieved by the ob-
served distribution (Table 2a). Importantly, the efficiency gain can be
achieved at an even lower degree of regional income inequality. Focus-
ing on transfers that operate via wage subsidies to a small set of regions
allows for an unambiguous welfare increase without compromising re-
gional equality. Note that an increase in the budget would clearlyshares. Second, we compute the general equilibrium allocation based on this draw. Third,
we supply this information to a numerical solver, whichmaximizes a regions utility func-
tion. We randomize the initial values to show that the solver converges to the same solu-
tion suggesting that it is unique. For a detailed documentation of our numerical
optimization approach, we refer to Appendix C.
f place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
Fig. 3.Optimal distribution of transfers. Notes: Panel a) shows the optimal distribution ofwage subsidies at the observed tax rates. Panel b) also focuses on the optimal distribution ofwage
subsidies but is calculated according to amuch higher budget where tax rates aremultiplied by 30. Panel c) and d) show the optimal distributions of investments in production amenities
and transportation infrastructure, respectively. In each case we hold tax rates used to raise the corresponding budget (i.e. either the budget for wage subsidies, investments in production
amenities or investments in transportation infrastructure) constant at the observed level. The figures depict local shares of the total transfer volume according to quantileswhere a darker
shading represents a higher transfer share.
33 Comparisons between the optimal and observed distributions of other transfer types
yield similarly low correlations: −0.024 for total transfers; −0.0003 for wage subsidies
(0.46 when restricting the sample to those with positive optimal level); 0.10 for invest-
ments in production amenities.
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mal policy. For instance, in Fig. 3b we show the resulting distribution
that would apply if we substantially increase tax rates by a factor of
30. In this case, a larger share of regions would receive transfers.
The optimal distribution of investments in transportation infrastruc-
ture is presented in Fig. 3d and indicates a very different pattern. The
highest shares of the transfer budget are allocated to central regions in
northern Italy, the Benelux countries, Germany, UK, and France. In
order to maximize aggregate welfare, a transfer scheme focusing on
transport cost reductions exerts the most significant spillover effects
at central places. This implies a substantial reallocation of transfers com-
pared to the current scheme: The correlation coefficient between the re-
gional distribution according to the optimal scheme and the one of
observed transfers under the official heading ‘Transport infrastructure’Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design o
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319is −0.11.33 Such a reallocation could achieve an efficiency gain of
about 0.40 percentage points compared to the existing distribution
(Table 2c). However, this welfare gain would come at higher regional
income inequality.
With regard to investments in local production amenities, the opti-
mal pattern suggests the highest transfer shares in Germany and the
UK where 0.22% and 0.12% of the total budget for Tna is supposed to be
allocated. However, the optimal distribution generally advises a broad
dispersion of transfers across European regions. The optimum isf place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
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the observed distribution and yields a higher degree of regional income
inequality than the observed one (Table 2b).
Finally, allocating all transfer types according to their optimal distri-
butions while keeping the aggregate budget for each transfer type con-
stant one could realize an efficiency gain of 1.06 percentage points
compared to the observed one while keeping tax rates constant
(Table 2d). Hence, a mere improvement of the distribution of transfers
substantially raises the welfare gain of EU regional policy. Notably, this
comes at the costs of somewhat higher regional inequality than in the
observed distribution. In Appendix D.1, we analyze the potential effi-
ciency gains if regional income inequality was to be held constant. Ag-
gregate welfare gains would still be material but are 0.35 percentage
points lower than without this constraint.
The migration responses in these scenarios are governed by the op-
timal distributions of transfer types in Fig. 3. In the case of an optimal
distribution of Tw, it is evident that Romania and Bulgaria would be
the beneficiaries. There, the population would increase by about 8.30%
relative to the observed equilibrium. As a response to the optimal distri-
butions of Td and Ta, we would see a population increase mostly in re-
gions in the center of the EU. We illustrate the changes in population
and other local outcomes for the simultaneous optimal distribution of
Tw, Ta, and Td in Fig. B.3 in the Appendix. This equilibrium would yield
inter-regional migration of 0.87% of the population.
What about the optimal scale of the transfer program? Our scenario
with an optimal distribution of transfers concerns a second-best alloca-
tion in the sense that we keep the level of taxes constant, which pre-
vents the complete internalization of prevailing externalities. The
optimal scale of the programwould be determined by the combination
of the estimated transfer elasticities, prevailing externalities and the ef-
ficiency costs of raising the budget – via taxes on labor income.
Abstracting from the latter, it would be efficient to expand the program
as is evident from an increase of welfare in the scenario with high taxes
(Fig. 3b) compared to the optimal distribution given the observed
taxes.34 However, significant increases in taxes required to finance an
optimally scaled transfer are unlikely to be politically enforceable.
In the following, we analyze the marginal welfare effects of transfer
types across regions, which outlines the intuition about the optimal al-
locations discussed above.
6. Marginal welfare effects of transfers
We decompose the marginal welfare effects of transfers into four
components: The direct effect of transfers, theprice index effect through
adjustment in wages and the effects via changes in own trades shares
and local population shares. Totally differentiating expected welfare V
with respect to transfers illustrates the weights put on these compo-
nents:
d lnV ¼ − α
σ−1
d lnπnn|fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflffl}
Adjustment own trade share
þα d lnyn þ d ln~an−d lndnnð Þ|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
Direct effects
−α d lnwn|fflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflffl}
Price index effect
þ αμ|{z}
Agglomeration force
− 1−αð Þ|fflfflffl{zfflfflffl}
Dispersion force
−
1
ε Taste heterogeneity|fflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl{zfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflfflffl}
0B@
1CA d lnλn|fflfflffl{zfflfflffl}
Change in population
:
ð24Þ
The first welfare implication is common across a wide range of trade
models and is due to changes in terms of trade, which result in adjust-
ments in own trade share as described in Arkolakis et al. (2012). Trans-
fers affect local prices and thereby alter the terms of trade. Second,34 Restricting transfer effects to income gains and further abstracting from the external-
ity via heterogeneous non-local ownership of land, the distortions via productivity spill-
overs and congestion could be internalized using a combination of proportional taxes
and lump sum transfers as shown in Fajgelbaum and Gaubert (2019). In this case, the
ranking of recipient regions according to their optimal net transfers under our fixed bud-
get constraint corresponds to the one for the optimal budget.
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local income, productivity or reduce local trade costs. This part of the
marginal welfare effect is characterized by decreasingmarginal returns.
Regions contributing a high share of the local rent income to the global
portfolio display a smaller direct effect of transfers because a share ιn of
the increase in land values will be passed on to residents of other re-
gions. Third, as local income increases, local production expands and
pays higher wages, which in turn translates into increases in the price
index of this region. This, in turn, negatively affects welfare as local
goods become relativelymore expensive. Fourth, changes in population
affect welfare through agglomeration forces, dispersion forces and het-
erogeneity of location tastes. As population concentrates in a location,
productivity increases, which makes the location ceteris paribus more
attractive. A population inflow into a location is accompanied by an in-
crease in land priceswhich, due to inelastic supply, leads to less housing
consumption per capita. If workers have relatively heterogeneous tastes
for regions (low ε), it is more likely that a large fraction of the individ-
uals entering the regions have a low amenity draw. In the extreme
case with homogeneous tastes (ε → ∞) there are no costs in terms of
amenity mismatch. In accordance with the literature on quantitative
economic geography, we restrict the parameter space to ensure that
the agglomeration force is dominated by the dispersion forces i.e. that
the last channel is always negative for population immigration.
Regional distribution. In order to infer the spatial distribution of
marginal welfare effects for each type of transfer, we conduct the fol-
lowing simulation experiments: we shock every region separately
with a marginal transfer and obtain welfare changes relative to the sit-
uation without transfers. The government budget required for this ex-
periment is again financed via the proportional tax rate introduced
above and it is evidently negligible in this case. For the purpose of isolat-
ing themarginal utility gain by transfer type, we eliminate the potential
responses of the respective other transfer types by alternately setting
two out of the three transfer channels to zero. Note that according to
our transfer functions, we refer to a unit increase of per capita transfers
in the case of wage subsidies and investments in production amenities
and to a unit increase in the absolute level in case of infrastructure in-
vestments. Fig. 4 illustrates the heterogeneous distribution of marginal
welfare effects: In panel a), we consider wage subsidies and observe a
strong positive effect on welfare in peripheral and relatively poor re-
gions. Overall, the welfare change due to a wage subsidy is highest in
Eastern and Southern European regions. In contrast, in panel b) it is ev-
ident that investments in transportation infrastructure are most effec-
tive in the core. Panel c) displays the effectiveness of investments in
production amenities: Marginal welfare effects tend to be high in
urban areas but generally show a relatively mixed pattern.
Role of location fundamentals. The heterogeneity of marginal wel-
fare effects must be driven by fundamental characteristics of the re-
gions. In order to gain insights into the role of location fundamentals,
we homogenize regions in terms of all location fundamentals such
that general equilibrium outcomes of marginal welfare effects of trans-
fers are ex-ante identical across regions. Then, we alternately set one of
the location fundamentals to its recovered or observed value while
keeping all others constant and calculate the marginal welfare effects
of transfers for each region separately.35 This returns a distribution of
marginal welfare effects of transfers along the observed values of the lo-
cation fundamental that is allowed to vary across regions. Following this
procedure, we can make ceteribus paribus statements of how location
fundamentals impact the marginal welfare effects of regional transfers.35 This exercise can also be interpreted as a difference-in-difference estimation of
regional transfers, where the second difference is the same for all regions. The mar-
ginal welfare effect is E½Ûn;T ;A jT ¼ 1;A ¼ 0−E½Ûn;T ;AjT ¼ 0;A ¼ 0−ðE½Ûn;T ;AjT ¼ 1;A ¼
1−E½Ûn;T ;AjT ¼ 0;A ¼ 1Þ, where T = 1 indicates that region n received a marginal
transfer and A = 1 denotes that all location fundamental are set to it's average
value for all regions and A = 0 denotes that one specific location fundamental is
set to it's observed value.
f place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
Fig. 4. Regional distribution of marginal welfare effects of transfers. Notes: We refer to a unit increase of per capita transfers in panel (a) wage subsidies and (b) production amenity
investments, whereas in panel (c) transport infrastructure investments we refer to a marginal increase in the absolute transfer level. The non-rival nature of transport infrastructure
investments would otherwise yield a higher marginal welfare effect in densely populated regions. The figure depicts marginal welfare changes reported by quantiles. A darker shading
represents a stronger effect, whereas a green color illustrates a positive effect.
14 Y. Blouri, M.V. Ehrlich / Journal of International Economics 125 (2020) 103319
Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design of place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319
Fig. 5. Location fundamentals and the marginal welfare effect of transfers Wage subsidies. Notes: Transfers as well as all fundamental location characteristics (i.e. Hn, Bn, ιn) except trade
costs and fundamental production amenities are set to the average values such that general equilibrium outcomes of marginal welfare effects of transfers depend only on dni or an. In the
left-hand panel, we set trade costs to the average value such that only fundamental production amenities an vary across regions. In the right-hand panel, we set fundamental production
amenities to the average value such that only trade costs∑idni vary across regions. In this case, not only own trade costs but also trade costs to all neighboring regions vary such that we
depict the marginal welfare effects against the sum of trade costs, which results in a scattered pattern instead of an exact relationship. Each figure shows the marginal welfare effect of
transfers. “Change in welfare” on the y-axis is normalized to facilitate comparison of welfare differences.
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Table 3
General vs. partial equilibrium effects of the observed transfer distribution.
GE Welfare (V̂n) PE Welfare Difference
Wage subsidies 0.05 0.10 −0.05
Production amenities 1.21 1.39 −0.18
Transport infrastructure 0.82 0.04 0.78
All transfers 2.08 1.52 0.56
Notes: The table compares welfare of the observed distribution of transfers relative to the
no-transfer scenario. Column1 shows thewelfare change for the general equilibriumanal-
ysis (equivalent to column 2 of Table 2). Column 2 shows the corresponding partial equi-
librium welfare changes (see direct effects in Eq. (24)). The partial equilibrium changes
exclude adjustments viamigration, trade, and localwages (price index). For the PEwelfare
changes we report the averages across regions. All values are reported in percentage
points.
37 Note that the adjustments in own trade costs are relatively minor because they are
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distributions of fundamental production amenities and geographical ac-
cessibility (i.e. sum of trade costs). The correlations in panels a) and
b) show that wage subsidies are most effective in regions with low pro-
ductivity and low accessibility. The reason is as follows: Regions with
low productivity or accessibility display relatively low income. In spatial
equilibrium, they must be attractive in terms of less congestion on the
housing market, which implies a relatively low population density.
Given a lower income, a marginal transfer yields a higher utility gain.
When choosing locations, individuals do not factor in the externalities
via productivity spillovers and congestion on the housingmarket.More-
over, the parameter constellation is such that congestion effects domi-
nate agglomeration spillovers. Thus, transfers towards regions
characterized by low population density and correspondingly low in-
come improve efficiency.
Panels c) and d), show that investments in production amenities
reach the highest welfare gains in regions with high fundamental pro-
duction amenities and high accessibility. The first result is due to our
transfer function (12) raising production amenities proportionally. Sim-
ilar reasoning applies for the role of accessibility: Ceteris paribus, central
places feature a higher population due to a lower price index that at-
tracts population until indirect utility is equalized. With productivity
spillovers according to (4), a higher population raises the productivity
gain due to a marginal transfer.
Considering investments in transportation infrastructure (panels
e) and f)), we find the highest welfare gains in regionswith high funda-
mental production amenities and high accessibility. The first result is
due to agglomeration economies – high productivity leads to dense
population and a sizable market, which raises the benefits of transport
cost reductions. The latter result is due to positive spillovers via the
transportation network: Central, highly accessible regions are relevant
for trade between many region pairs because they are located in the
close proximity of their respective least-cost routes. Accordingly, an im-
provement of the infrastructure in central regions will be passed on to
the effective trade costs for a large share of other region pairs. Moreover,
according to (11), the percentage reduction of travel time following a
marginal investment is higher for adjacent region pairs with low travel
time.
We illustrate the role of the remaining location fundamentals in Figs.
B.4, B.5, and B.6 in the Appendix. Location amenities, residential land
supply, and the share paid to the global portfolio enter positively into
the marginal welfare effects of all three transfer types. The reasons are
intuitive as a social planner would ceteris paribus aim to allocate indi-
viduals to places with high consumption amenities and plenty of land
available such as to leverage the fundamental merits of locations and
minimize congestion costs.36 A higher share of contributions to the
global portfolio implies that the income gains from transfers are spread
more broadly across regions. If regions are ceteris paribus identical due
to decreasing marginal utility, a broad distribution generates a higher
marginal welfare effect than a concentrated distribution.
Mix of transfer types. As shown above, the investments in local pro-
duction amenities are optimally distributed towards central, well acces-
sible places. At the same time, infrastructure investments are optimally
allocated towards productive places, which implies a complementarity
between these two types of transfers. In contrast, for wage subsidies,
the most efficient distribution is towards low productivity and low ac-
cessibility places.
The model also allows us to change the aggregate shares of the
budget allocated to the different types. If we allocate the whole budget
into either one of the transfer types, the maximum attainable welfare is
lower than for the observed aggregate mix due to decreasing returns to
each transfer type. As long as there is a certain mix between the three
transfer types on the aggregate level, welfare is relatively insensitive36 Note that marginal utility increases in consumption amenities according to (1).
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to changes in the regional distribution of transfers, which is the focus
of our analysis. One should bear in mind though that a comprehensive
evaluation of changes in the aggregate shares should account for the du-
rable nature of infrastructure and hencewould call for a dynamic frame-
work. We discuss this in more detail in Appendix D.2.
7. General vs. partial equilibrium responses
A simple cost-benefit analysis capturing only direct effects of trans-
fers in recipient regions could lead to a significant misinterpretation of
the welfare effects. According to (24), we define partial equilibrium ef-
fects of transfers as the direct changes in local income, production ame-
nities and own trade costs, which can be identified by reduced form
analyses. However, direct effects induce adjustments in migration,
trade and wages as captured by the general equilibrium model.
Table 3 quantifies the differences between general and partial equi-
librium responses to transfers. The results show that a policy maker
considering only partial equilibrium effects overestimates the welfare
effects in case of wage subsidies and production amenities. In case of in-
vestments in transportation infrastructure, the partial equilibrium in
fact underestimates the aggregate welfare change. These opposite as-
sessments arise due to investments in transportation infrastructure af-
fecting the general equilibrium not only via own trade costs but also
via reductions in travel time for other region pairs.37 This implies further
welfare gains that are not accounted for in partial equilibrium. In our ap-
plication, the latter category of transfers turns out to be relatively im-
portant. Thus, considering the welfare effects across all transfer types,
we find that a partial equilibrium approach would underestimate the
aggregate gains. This conclusion is supported by a comparison with
the reduced form literature: Becker et al. (2010) estimate an impact of
Objective 1 transfers on growth of real income per capita of about 1.6
percentage points, which is comparable to our partial equilibrium effect
obtained for the sum of transfers in Table 3.38
8. Conclusions
In this paper, we present a quantitative analysis of the general equi-
librium effects of place-based policies. We integrate the three major
types of regional transfers, i.e. wage subsidies, investments in local pro-
duction amenities and investments in transportation infrastructure,
into a rich economic geography framework. The model performs well
inmatching important patterns of the distribution of economic activ-
ity in Europe. Applying it to two decades of regional data, we esti-
mate the parameters of the model and recover cross-sectional asonly caused by traders having a taste for non-optimal routes, i.e. detours bypassing the
own region.
38 The reduced form analysis by Pellegrini et al. (2013) finds a similar effect on income
growth of approximately 0.9%.
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tification of the elasticities of local production amenities and trade
costs with regard to transfers, we exploit changes in the regional el-
igibility for EU transfers.
We then perform counterfactual experiments where we remove
transfers or redistribute them uniformly across regions. Overall, we
find that the EU place-based policy led to a positive welfare effect of
2.08% for the period 2007–13 compared to a scenario without transfers.
This level effect has to be interpreted in the light of the assumption that
there is no crowding-out of member state investments through EU
transfers. Irrespective of the level effect, we show that EU regional pol-
icy does not realize the potential of distributing the investments in a
welfare optimal way: A uniform distribution turns out to reach a higher
welfare level for two out of three transfer types than the EU's current
scheme.
Contrasting the welfare optimal distribution of transfers with the
observed one provides us with a quantification of the potential welfare39 If n and i are not adjacent, then ~dni ¼ ∞ indicates that there is no direct connection.We also
However, this does not restrict traders to ship goods from n to n.
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optimal distribution could increase the efficiency gains of transfers by
about 50% (from 2.08% to 3.14% compared to the no-transfer scenario).
Regarding the type of transfers, there is no one-size-fits-all approach for
optimal distribution:While wage subsidies should be limited to the few
poorest regions, infrastructure investment should rather focus on cen-
tral regions. This serves as a basis for our detailed derivation of the de-
terminants of an optimal transfer scheme and the complementarities
of different transfer types. We show that investments in local produc-
tion amenities and transportation infrastructure can be leveraged by al-
locating them such as to maximize positive spillovers.
While there are certainly further dimension of heterogeneity in the
effectiveness of transfers such as the quality of local institutions or dif-
ferences in the production functions of public infrastructure, we believe
that our systematic approach for an optimal distribution of a given
transfer budget is informative for policy makers as it reveals the impor-
tance of adjustments via trade and migration.Appendix A. Estimation and calibration
In this section, we describe how we estimate the parameters and how we invert the model to recover location fundamentals.A.1. Trade costs (dni)
Trade costs are based on a framework developed in Allen and Arkolakis (2016). Trade is undertaken by a continuum of heterogeneous agents v
whoendogenously choose a path pwith length K to get from n to i. We specify the cost of shipping a good from adjacent locations r to i as a function of
road travel time39
~dri ¼ eβTravelTimeri ; ðA:1Þ
where TravelTimeri is measured in hours and β is a factor converting travel time into transport costs. Aggregate trade costs d
^
niðpÞ from n to i are the
product of the transport costs along path p
d
^
ni pð Þ ¼
YK
k¼1
~dpk−1 ;pk : ðA:2Þ
Each trader faces a heterogenous path-specific taste εni(p,v) to ship a good from n to i, which is assumed to be drawn i.i.d. from a Fréchet distri-
butionwith shape parameter θ N 0. Total costs of a trader v travelling from n to i along path p are d
^
niðpÞεniðp; vÞ. Let dni(v) indicate the costs of trader v
choosing the trader-specific least-cost path between n and i
dni vð Þ ¼ min
p∈Pk ;K ≥0
d
^
ni pð Þεni p; vð Þ: ðA:3Þ
We allow traders to choose any possible path to ship a good from n to i. Themistakes traders incur by choosing non-optimal routes are governed
by the shape parameter θ. A higher value of θ indicates greater agreement across traders, where in the limit case of no heterogeneity θ→∞ all traders
choose the least-cost route. The calibration of θ determines the likelihood of mistakes and randomness in the choice of routes. Thus, the framework
we use is a generalization of the least-costs approach and allows a trader to ship a good on second-best routes. By using the properties of the Fréchet
distribution, expected trade costs dni become
dni ≡ Ev dni vð Þ½  ¼ c ∑
∞
K¼0
∑
p∈K
d
^
ni pð Þ−θ
 !
−1
θ
; ðA:4Þ
where c ≡ Γðθ−1
θ
Þand consist of trade costs realized on all possible paths. Given the extreme value distribution, the probability a trader chooses path p
and goes from n to i is given by
Ξdni pð Þ ¼ Pr d
^
ni pð Þ≤ min d
^
ni pð Þ
n o
;∀ p∈PK ;K ≥0
 
¼ dni pð Þ
−θ
∑∞K¼0∑
∞
p0∈Pij;K dni p
0ð Þ−θ
: ðA:5Þ
As shown in Allen and Arkolakis (2016) expected trade costs can be expressed as a Neumann series with weighted adjacency matrix ~D ¼ ½~d−θni :
d−θni ¼ c−θ
X∞
K¼0
~D
K
ni; ðA:6Þassume that ~dnn ¼ ∞ and exclude outgoing paths starting and ending in the same location.
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K
ni is (n, i)’s element of adjacency matrix ~D to the power of K.
40 The Neumann series converges to ∑∞K¼0 ~D
K
ni ¼ ðI−~DÞ
−1
≡ F, where I is the
identity matrix. Reformulating the above equation, we obtain Eq. (9) relating the adjacency matrix to expected trade cost
dni ¼ Γ
θ−1
θ
 
f nið Þ
−
1
θ ; ðA:7Þ
where fni refers to the (n,i) element of the route cost matrix F. This expression takes into account that traders minimize heterogenous trader- and
path-specific trade costs. By applying the matrix calculus described in Allen and Arkolakis (2016) we derive from Eq. (A.5) the probability of using
link klwhen shipping a good from i to n
Ξklni ¼
1
c
dni
dnk~dkldli
 !θ
: ðA:8Þ
The term dni in the numerator reflects expected trade costs from n to i, whereas the denominator represents expected trade costs from n to i along
link kl. This equation provides a clear intuition: Themore it costs to ship a good through link kl relative to the unconstrained route, the less likely it is
that traders use this link. The probability of making wide detours decreases with higher degrees of trade routes agreement (high θ). As a result, the
reduction of trade costs ismore relevant, the closer the improved bilateral link on the optimal route. Hence, an investment reducing direct trade costs
of link ~dkl will have consequences for expected bilateral trade costs of all other regions. These effects are more pronounced the closer the direct link to
the unconstraint one. Thus, investments reducing travel time only marginally affect effective trade costs of distant links.
Estimation of trade costs. Using GIS software, we identify adjacent NUTS2 regionswhere we assume regionsmaintaining a ferry connection to be
adjacent. Ferry connections ensure a comprehensive transport network, which connects the EU continent with the islands. The corresponding infor-
mation is obtained fromopenstreetmap.com. Data about TravelTimeri between adjacent regions r and i stems from theRRGGISDatabase and contains
detailed information about different speed limits, slope gradients, congestion etc.. The variable TravelTimeri measures time (in hours) travelled on
roads from the centroid of r to the centroid of i and is obtained at the NUTS2 level. To proceed and compute trade costs dni, we use Eq. (9) as well
as information about direct trade costs ~dni and parameters θ and β.
As Truck-specific trade data does not exist for Europe, we set the Fréchet parameter governing heterogeneity of traders θ=136.13 according to
estimates obtained by Allen and Arkolakis (2016). With this information and data about TravelTimeriwe can specify adjacency matrix ~D. The param-
eter calibrations for θ andσ, togetherwith gravity Eq. (5) and the definition of trade cost (9), can be used to estimate the factor converting travel time
to trade cost β included in adjacency matrix ~D. To obtain β, we perform a non-linear least squares estimation and minimize the sum of squared re-
siduals between observed and implied trade by the model
min
β
X
n;i∈N
log XDatani
 
−β0−
σ−1
θ
log I−~D
h i−1
ni
 
− log δnð Þ− log ηi
  2
: ðA:9Þ
We demean trade and trade costs such that we can neglect the constant β0 and importer and exporter fixed effects. Data on bilateral road freight
Xni
DATA among NUTS2 regions stem from the European Transport Policy Information System. We estimate a value of β = 0.068. Fig. A.1 panel
a) depicts a strong correlation of−0.709 between the freight data and the values of trade costs obtained from the estimation approach described above.
Robustness check. We compare the values for trade costs derived above with two alternative estimates. Specifically, we use a poisson pseudo-
maximum-likelihood (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) estimator and a purely distance-based approach using a constant elasticity dni = distni0.43
as inMonte et al. (2018). Panels b) and c) in Fig. A.1 compare our benchmark estimates for trade costs dniwith the two alternative approaches. Over-
all, our measure of trade cost is qualitatively similar to the alternatives as is evident from this figure and the high correlations.
Fig. A.1. Comparison of trade cost. Note: We use our estimate of β = 0.068 for the factor converting travel time to trade costs. This estimate minimizes the sum of squared residuals
between demeaned log freight and demeaned log trade costs. The correlation between the trade costs in our benchmark model and traditional, alternative trade cost measures in panels
(b) and (c) is 0.8 and 0.7, respectively.40 Note, ~Dni ¼ 0 indicates no connections between n and i, ~Dni ¼ 1 indicates a costs-less connection and ~Dni∈ð0;1Þ indicates a costly connection.
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In order to obtain transfer elasticities κa and κd we pool three time periods t ∈ {1999,2006,2013} and run regression equations corresponding to
(11) and (12). In the regression equations we add time-fixed effectsΩtd,Ωta, region-fixed effects absorb γri; lnðanÞ, and ζri, td , ζn, ta reflect the error terms:.
TravelTimeri;t ¼ γri−κd  ln Tdr;t þ Tdi;t þ 1
 
þΩdt þ ζdri;t ; ðA:10Þ
.
ln ~an;t
  ¼ ln anð Þ þ κa  ln Tan;t=Ln;t þ 1 þΩat þ ζan;t : ðA:11Þ
Table A.1 reports the results of these regressions. For each of the two dependent variables – lnð~an;tÞ and TravelTimeri, t –we run three types of
specifications: columns (1) and (4) use the sum of transfers across all types to a region and a transportation link, ln(Tn, t/Ln, t+1) and ln(Tr, t+ Ti, t+
1) as the explanatory variables of interest; columns (2) and (5) represent our benchmark specifications using only investments in production ame-
nities and transportation infrastructure respectively (as shown in the equations above); columns (3) and (6) report the regression discontinuity
specifications and show the effect of a binary indicator for whether a region received Objective 1 funds during the respective time period.
Transfers for the years 1999, 2006, and 2013 aremeasured as the average annual transfers between 1993 and 99, 2006–13, and 2007–13, respec-
tively. Note that Objective 1 status was always assigned for the full budgeting period. By adding time-fixed effects, we absorb any differences across
periods that are common across regions. Region-fixed effects capture time-invariant variation across regions.
While the fixed effects reduce potential endogeneity bias due to e.g. peripheral regions displaying a lower productivity and a higher transfer
intensity, there may still be unobserved time-region-variant factors that influence transfer intensity as well as outcomes. Following Becker et al.
(2010)we address these remaining endogeneity concerns by applying a regression discontinuity design. The regression discontinuity design exploits
the fact that only regionswith a per capita incomeof less than 75% of the EU average are eligible for the highest transfer intensity referred asObjective
1 funds.41 Intuitively, this identification strategy rests on the idea that the assignment of transfers is quasi-random for regions close to the threshold.
Note that both RDD specifications include third-order polynomial functions of the forcing variable, which determined eligibility for Objective 1 trans-
fers, i.e. per capita GDP relative to the EU average in the relevant years.
Comparing the fixed effects specifications for total transfers (column 1) and investments in production amenities (column 2) shows
that the estimated elasticities, κa, are very similar (0.006 and 0.007). This is due to the high correlation between Tn and Tna. Likewise, the confidence
bounds of the estimates for κd (0.004 and 0.007) are overlapping for total transfers (column 4) and investments in transportation infrastructure (col-
umn 5).
The point estimates for Objective 1 status do not directly correspond to the parameters κa and κd as the RDD specifications identify the average
treatment effect of Objective 1 transfers. Hence, in order to compute the implied values of κa and κd, we divide the treatment effect by the log differ-
ence of average transfer intensities of Objective 1 and non-Objective 1 regions. This yields corresponding values of κa =0.006 and κd =0.005. Thus,
the RDD estimates support our preferred estimates of κa and κd in columns (2) and (5), respectively. Note that the choice of specification has only a
minor effect on the analysis of the optimal spatial distribution of transfers and is more crucial for the level effects of transfers.
Table A.1
Direct effects of transfers.41 Thresholds are well specified to year
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icies: A structural evaluation of EU regional tRDD(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)tal Transfers 0.007⁎⁎ −0.007⁎⁎(0.003) (0.003)
rod. Transfers 0.006⁎⁎(0.003)
fra. Transfers −0.004⁎⁎⁎(0.001)
bjective 1 0.015⁎ −0.028⁎⁎(0.009) (0.014)
bservations 712 712 712 2990 2990 2990
o. regions/No. links 264 264 264 1080 1080 1080NNotes: All specifications include time and region fixed effects. Columns (1) and (4) consider the sum of transfers across all types to a region or transportation link i.e. Tn, t or Tri, t. In column
(2) the explanatory variable corresponds to investments in production amenities, Tn, ta . In column (5) the explanatory variable corresponds to investments in transportation infrastructure,
Tri, t
d . Columns (3) and (6) report the RDD specifications where Objective 1 is the average treatment effect of Objective 1 transfers. RDD specifications include third-order polynomial func-
tions of the forcing variable, which determined eligibility for Objective 1 transfers, i.e. per capita GDP relative to the EU average in the relevant years. In columns (1)–(3), we additionally
control for the fraction of people having a tertiary education, log of consumption amenities, log of population density, and log of the sum of the distance to all other regions.We lose a few
observations due tomissing data prior to 2007, non-EUmembership, and due to changes in theNUTS2 definitions. The estimation of kd uses only links with a common land border. Robust
standard errors in brackets, ⁎p b 0.10, ⁎⁎p b 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎p b 0.01.
A.3. Estimation of heterogeneous location preferences and agglomeration elasticity (ε, μ)
In panel a) of Table A.2, we show regression estimates of the heterogeneity of preferences and in panel b) we report the coefficients of the
agglomeration elasticity as described in Section 4. For the estimations of both parameters, we apply instrumental variable approaches using different
instruments.
In columns (1) and (2) of panel a), we use centrality measured by the sum of distance to all other regions to instrument real income. While
column (1) includes the whole sample, column (2) uses a reduced sample for which have data to compute a Bartik-type instrument. The Bartik in-
strument is used in columns (3) and (4) and it is formally defined for our three time periods as.ransfers,
20 Y. Blouri, M.V. Ehrlich / Journal of International Economics 125 (2020) 103319Bartikn;t ¼
X
ind
Ln;ind;1985
Ln;1985
 !
VA−n;ind;t−VA−n;ind;1985
VA−n;ind;1985
 
; ðA:12Þ
where the first term measures the sectoral employment share of a predetermined time period and the second term corresponds to the average
growth rate in gross value added in industry ind of year t.42 Subscript −n indicates that region n‘s industry is excluded from the calculation of the
average industry growth rates. The data to calculate the Bartik instrument stems from Cambridge Econometrics’ European Regional Database and
it is not available for the whole sample because we need sector shares well before the start of the first period (i.e. 1985). The latter does not exist
for Eastern Europe. In column (4), we instrument real income using both a region's centrality and the Bartik instrument. The exogeneity assumption
of our instruments is supported by the fact that estimates of all combination of instruments converge to values within a range of one standard devi-
ation and that the instruments pass the Sargan test for overidentification.
For the estimation of the agglomeration elasticity in panel b), we use data about the quality of soils as an instrument for population shares.
Specifically, in column (1) we employ dummy variables based on the “depth to rock” classification, whereas in column (2) we employ dummy var-
iables based on the “Topsoil mineralogy” classification. The specification taking both instruments into account is reported in column (3). We find
again strong support for the exogeneity assumption of our instruments, as all estimates of all combinations of instruments converge to values within
a range of one standard deviation and the instruments pass the Sargan tests.
Table A.2
Heterogenous location preferences and agglomeration elasticity.
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al & business services, and non-market services.
R
O
N
F
R
O
In
C
B
Lo
O
N
F
R
O
In
La
Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Eh
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2(1)sectors: Agriculture, industry, constru
rlich, On the optimal design of
020.103319(2)ction,wholesale-retail-transport & dist
place-based policies: A structur(3)ribution-communications-hotels-cate
al evaluation of EU regional tra(4)eal income (ln(ynPnαrn1−α)) 2.853⁎⁎⁎ 3.326⁎⁎⁎ 3.537⁎⁎ 3.340⁎⁎⁎(0.574) (0.666) (1.397) (0.661)
bservations 712 584 584 584
o. regions 264 198 198 198
first-stage 219.973 196.464 33.095 100.712
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errors in brackets, ⁎p b 0.10, ⁎⁎p b 0.05, ⁎⁎⁎p b 0.01.
A.4. Trade balance
Fig. A.2 illustrates the estimation of the share of payments to the global portfolio (ι) discussed in Section 4 as well as observed and predicted
trade balances. Regions characterized by high trade surpluses as for instanceNorth and SouthHolland (NL32 andNL33), contributemost of their land
rents to the global portfolio. We observe small deviations between the observed and predicted trade balances, which is due to the bounds of ιn ∈
(0,1). An example where this parametric restriction is binding concerns regions with a substantial trade surplus. These regions should spend
more than their returns from land to the global portfolio to exactly match the observed trade balance. Overall, we capture most of the heterogeneity
of trade imbalances as is evident from the high correlation of 0.993 between modeled and predicted trade balances. Using the estimated ιn, we can
compute the per-capita land rents paid into the global portfolio (
ιnHnrn
Ln
) as well as the payments every individual obtains from the portfolio of land
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Fig. A.2. Comparison between modeled and observed trade balance and contribution to global portfolio ιn. Notes: Blue and red bars illustrate the observed ϒData and solved trade balance ϒModel according to (14), respectively. Diamonds show the
contribution to the global portfolio ιn that minimize the least square deviations between the modeled and observed values.
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We recover production amenities and trade shares as follows: Substituting equilibrium Eqs. (6) and (4) in (20) yields.
~a1−σi L
μ 1−σð Þþ1
n ¼ αw−σi
X
n∈N
d1−σni Lnyn
∑k∈N
dnkwk
ak
 1−σ : ðA:13Þ
By using Eq. (A.13) we can recover location i‘s production amenity ~an , given data for {Ln,yn} and substituting parameters {σ,α,μ}, estimates of
trade costs (dni) as well as the recovered information about wages (wn). Assuming balanced trade, Redding (2016) in his Proposition 6 proofs that
the solution to this equation is unique (up to scale). We check the uniqueness of our solution by using random initial values for our fixed-point-
iteration algorithm. As a result, we always converge to the same solution suggesting that the solution to this equation is unique, though it embodies
unbalanced trade.
Oncewe know regions' production amenities, we can recover productivity by (4) and bilateral trade shares according to (6). Again, we substitute
data for population shares (λn), estimates of trade costs (dni) as well as recovered information on wages and production amenities fwn; ~ang.A.6. Location amenities (Bn)
A similar approach allows us to recover location amenities. Substituting (16) in population shares (17) we obtain.
λ−1n ΦnBn ¼
X
k∈N
BkΦk; ðA:14Þ
where Φn
1
ε ¼ ð anyn
dnnwn
Þ
α
πα=ð1−σÞnn
Hn
λn
1−α
. Location amenities prevent people from consuming the highest attainable real income. Using Eq. (A.14)
jointly with data for {λn,yn,Hn}, already recovered information about {wn,an,πnn}, parameters {σ,α,ε}, and estimates of own trade costs (dnn) we
can recover Bn
1
ε .A.7. Summary statistics of exogenous and recovered variables
We present summary statistics of all our exogenous and recovered variables in Table A.3. Table A.4 shows that our recovered variables do not
exhibit high correlations and capture sufficiently independent variation.Table A.3
Summary statistics.VariableO
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ilateral trade costs (dni) 4.15 3.97 1.02 83.97 69,432
wn trade costs (dnn) 1 0 1 1 264irect trade costs (~dri) 1.22 0.32 1.02 3.7 1352ravel time (TravelTimeri) 2.62 2.84 0.27 19.08 1352
ransfers per-capita (TnLn) 136.84 190.34 0.34 891.56 264
n Obj. 1 regions 366.55 184.54 55 891.56 80
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Euros, tax rates in percents, price index in thousand, rental price of land in million, and location amenity in 1016 units.Table A.4
Correlation matrix of recovered variables.an Bn πnnn 1 −0.288 0.204
n 1 0.060
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In the following, we derive a system of equations allowing us to undertake amodel based counterfactual analysis of EU regional policy. Following
Dekle et al. (2007), we denote a counterfactual change as x̂ ¼ x
0
x
, where x is the observed variable and x′ is the unobserved counterfactual value of x.
Given model's parameters {α,μ,σ,ε,ιn,κa,κd,β,θ} and variables fλn;wn;πni; yn; τn; Tn;γdri; ang, we use the following system of equations to solve for
counterfactual changes in the model's endogenous variables fŵn; ŷn; λ̂n; π̂ni; ân; d̂nig, which determine changes in aggregate welfare.
Adjustments of regional wages follow directly from goods market clearing Eq. (20) and are.
ŵiwiλ̂iλi ¼ α
X
k∈N
π̂kiπkiŷkykλ̂kλk: ðB:1Þ
Changes in counterfactual productivity follow from (4) and become.
ân ¼ b~anL̂μn ðB:2Þ
Next, we divide the counterfactual by the equilibrium trade share using (6) and obtain.
π̂ni ¼
d̂niŵi
âi
 !1−σ
∑k∈N
d̂nkŵk
âk
 !1−σ
πnk
; ðB:3Þ
Similarly, we can substitute information on real income (16) in populationmobility (17). To express the change in counterfactual population, we
divide the counterfactual with the equilibrium population share and obtain.
λ̂n ¼ π̂nnð Þ
αε
1−σ
ânŷn
d̂nnŵn
 !αε
1
λ̂n
  1−αð Þε
∑k∈N π̂kkð Þ
αε
1−σ
âkŷk
d̂kkŵk
 !αε
1
λ̂k
 ! 1−αð Þε
λk
: ðB:4Þ
Using Eq. (15), we can express per capita income in the counterfactual equilibrium as.
ŷnyn ¼
1
α þ ιn−αιn ŵnwn 1−τnð Þ þ
T̂
w
n T
w
n
λ̂nλnL
þ χ̂χ
 !
; ðB:5Þ
where returns from global portfolio change due to adjustments in income and population are χ̂χ ¼ ð1−αÞ∑nιnŷnynλ̂nλn þ∑n
1
L
ðT̂dnTdn þ T̂
a
nT
a
nÞ. We
run simulations for each investment type separately and alternately set two out of the three transfer channels to zero. Thus, local investments affect
production amenities.
~a0n ¼ an T̂
a
nT
a
n
λ̂nλnL
þ 1
 !κa
; ðB:6Þ
or.
TravelTime0ri ¼ γdri−κd  ln T̂
d
r T
d
r þ T̂
d
i T
d
i þ 1
 
; ðB:7Þ
where the trade cost routine (see Section A.1) converts travel time to trade costs. Tax revenuemust be equal to place-based policy expenditure such
that government budget is always balanced.X
n∈N
ŵnwnλ̂nλnτ̂nτn ¼
X
n∈N
λ̂nλnT̂nTn: ðB:8Þ
We obtain the change in aggregate welfare from expected utility (19):.
bV ¼ 1
π̂nn
  α
σ−1 ŷnb~an
ŵnd̂nn
 !α
λ̂n
 αμ− 1−αð Þ−1
ε : ðB:9Þ
Eqs. (B.1)–(B.8) enable us to solve for counterfactual changes inwages ŵn, income ŷn, trade shares π̂ni, population shares λ̂n, production amenities
ân and own trade costs d̂nn, which are used to calculate counterfactual changes in welfare.Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design of place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319
25Y. Blouri, M.V. Ehrlich / Journal of International Economics 125 (2020) 103319Fig. B.1. No-transfer scenario compared to observed distribution of transfers. Notes: Transfers operate through all three channels: wage subsidies, investments in production amenities,
and investments in transport infrastructure. The figure depicts changes in the respective variable reported by quantiles. A darker shading represents a stronger effect, where a green (red)
color illustrates an increase (decrease). The change in total transfers (T̂n ¼ T 0n=Tn) is zero as Tn′=0 for all regions in the no-transfer scenario. See Fig. 1 for the observed distribution of total
transfers.Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design of place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319
26 Y. Blouri, M.V. Ehrlich / Journal of International Economics 125 (2020) 103319Fig. B.2. Uniform distribution of transfers compared to observed scenario. Notes: Transfers operate through all three channels: wage subsidies, investments in production amenities, and
investments in transport infrastructure. Thefigure depicts changes in the respective variable reported by quantiles. A darker shading represents a stronger effect, where a green (red) color
illustrates an increase (decrease).Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design of place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319
27Y. Blouri, M.V. Ehrlich / Journal of International Economics 125 (2020) 103319Fig. B.3. Optimal distribution compared to observed distribution of transfers. Notes: We consider the sum of transfers operating through wage subsidies, investments in production
amenities, and investments in transport infrastructure. The figures above compare the observed equilibrium to a counterfactual situation where all three types of transfers are distributed
optimally. The figure depicts changes in the respective variable reported by quantiles. A darker shading represents a stronger effect, where a green (red) color illustrates an increase
(decrease).Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design of place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319
28 Y. Blouri, M.V. Ehrlich / Journal of International Economics 125 (2020) 103319Fig. B.4.Marginal welfare effects of wage subsidies. Notes: Transfers, as well as all fundamental location characteristics (i.e. an; dni), except location attractiveness, residential land supply
and share to global portfolio are set to the average values such that general equilibrium outcomes of marginal welfare effects of wage subsidies depend only on Bn, Hn or ιn. Each figure
shows the marginal welfare effect of wage subsidies. “Change in welfare” on the y-axis is normalized to facilitate comparison of welfare differences.Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design of place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319
Fig. B.5.Marginal welfare effects of investments in production amenities. Notes: Transfers, as well as all fundamental location characteristics (i.e. an; dni), except location attractiveness,
residential land supply and share to global portfolio are set to the average values such that general equilibrium outcomes of marginal welfare effects of investments in production
amenities depend only on Bn, Hn or ιn. Each figure shows the marginal welfare effect of investments in production amenities. “Change in welfare” on the y-axis is normalized to facilitate
comparison of welfare differences.
29Y. Blouri, M.V. Ehrlich / Journal of International Economics 125 (2020) 103319
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30 Y. Blouri, M.V. Ehrlich / Journal of International Economics 125 (2020) 103319Fig. B.6.Marginal welfare effects of investments in transport infrastructure. Note: Transfers, as well as all fundamental location characteristics (i.e. an; dni), except location attractiveness,
residential land supply and share to global portfolio are set to the average values such that general equilibrium outcomes of marginal welfare effects of investments in transportation
infrastructure depend only on Bn,Hn or ιn. Eachfigure shows themarginal welfare effect of investments in transportation infrastructure. “Change inwelfare” on the y-axis is normalized to
facilitate comparison of welfare differences.Appendix C. Optimal transfers
The numerical optimization routine with a government setting the welfare optimizing transfer policy follows the Mathematical Programs With
Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC) approach described in Su and Judd (2012) for economic models and particularly applied to trade models in Ossa
(2014). We maximize indirect utility of one arbitrary region and take the model's equilibrium conditions as constraints. Given this nonlinear
constrained optimization procedure, the solution characterizes a spatial equilibrium defined in Section 3.6.
We either allow the government to provide per-capita wage subsidies or to undertake investments in production amenities or investments in
transport infrastructure. Accordingly, we set two of our three transfer channels to zero to compute the optimal transfer shares. For all our optimiza-
tions, we hold tax rates constant such that a shift in the transfer budget may only be generated by different distributions of transfers.Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design of place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regional transfers,
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319
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The step-by-step solution procedure for the problem stated above is as follows
1. We form a random initial guess for transfer shares (Tnw,Tna or Tnd) from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 109. We take absolute
values to ensure a positive initial guess and normalize it such that the sum is equal to 1.
2. Based on random transfer shareswe compute equilibriumvalues forwages (wn), population shares (λn), own trade shares (πnn), indirect utility of
region 1 (V1) and total transfers paid (T ) satisfying equilibrium constraints (B.1)-(B.8). We take this as an initial guess for the endogenous
variables.
3. We maximize welfare subject to the equilibrium constraints by numerically running the problem in Artely's Knitro solver.
For any random initial guess, our problem converges to the same solution. In this optimal allocation, utility is equalized, government budget is
balanced and all equilibrium conditions (as described in Section 3.6) are fulfilled up to a small epsilon ε b 1−10.
Appendix D. Extensions
D.1. Optimal distribution of transfers conditional on constant inequality
Given the aim of the European Union to enhance efficiency while strengthening regional cohesion, the objective function assumed in the bench-
mark model may not necessarily conform with the political ambitions. Our setting is flexible enough to incorporate an additional constraint, which
holds regional income inequality constant. In particular, we use the coefficient of variation as a dispersion measure because it is scale-invariant and
differentiable such that we can provide the gradients for the MPEC approach solving the optimization problem. The results are summarized in
Table D.1.
Table D.1
Welfare effects of transfers while holding income inequality stable.WcC
W
2
1
0
0
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6/j.jinteco.2020.103319(b) Production amenitiesObserved Optimal Observedral evaluation of EU regional traOptimal(1) (2) (1) (2)elfare (V̂n) 0.05% 0.19% 1.21% 1.63%VðynÞ −0.34% −0.34% −0.82% −0.82%
(c) Transportation infrastructure (d) All transfers
Observed Optimal Observed Optimal
(1) (2) (1) (2)elfare (V̂n) 0.82% 0.95% 2.08% 2.79%VðynÞ −0.07% −0.07% −1.22% −1.22%cC
The table compares outcomes relative to the no-transfer equilibrium. Columns 1 refer to the observed distribution of transfers and columns 2 refer to the optimal distribution of transfers
holding regional income inequality (in nominal terms) constant. In panels a), b), and c), we isolate individual transfer types whereas panel d) considers the sum of transfers.We keep tax
rates constant at the observed level. When we restrict the analysis to one transfer type, we keep taxes at the level required to finance the observed budget of the respective transfer type.
Recall that the optimal distribution of wage subsidies does not only increase welfare but also reduces income inequality compared to the ob-
served distribution. Consequently, restricting the level of inequality to the observed one comes at some efficiency costs compared to the uncon-
strained optimum in Table 2. With regard to investments in production amenities, transportation infrastructure as well as total transfers, the
optimal distribution in Table 2 led to an increase in income inequality. In each case, we can reach significant welfare gains over the observed distri-
butionwhile holding inequality constant. However, the comparison of Tables 2 andD.1 shows a trade-off between inequality and efficiency. Thewel-
fare gains are 0.06, 0.27, and 0.35%age points lower for Tna, Tnd and total transfers Tn, respectively when restricting the optimal distribution to holding
income inequality at the observed level.
D.2. Variations in the aggregate shares of transfer types
Thewelfare gains of the optimal distribution over the observeddistribution in Table 2 are fully due to adjustments in the spatial distribution aswe
keep the aggregate shares of each transfer type constant. Themodel also allows us to change the aggregatemix of transfer types. In the following, we
iterate over a set of combinations of aggregate shares of transfers and compute for each set the optimal spatial distribution of each transfer type and
the correspondingwelfare level, see Table D.2. For ease of reference, thefirst line repeats the observed allocation across transfer typeswith anoptimal
spatial distribution of each as shown in Table 2 (d), column 3. In lines 2–4 of Table D.2, we set the share of either transfer type to unity. Line 5 shows
thewelfare realized in a situation where each transfer type receives one third of the aggregate budget and the spatial distribution of each type is op-
timized again. Lines 6–8 allocate half of the budget to one transfer type and split the remainder equally among the other transfer types.
Table D.2
Different aggregate shares of transfer types.Shares of aggregate budget by transfer type (in percent) Welfare changeTw Ta Td V̂n9(observed) 37 (observed) 34 (observed) 3.144
00 0 0 0.543100 0 2.079
0 100 1.340(continued on next page)nsfers,
T
4
ro
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5
2
3 According to Tabaković and Schlangen (2015) the expected lifetime of roads is between 20 and 40 years, the Office of the State Auditor (2002) expects 20 years. If
ads was uniformly distributed over the seven-year period, a 30 year lifetime would yield 26 years of remaining lifetime for roads constructed during the budgeting
Please cite this article as: Y. Blouri andM.V. Ehrlich, On the optimal design of place-based policies: A structural evaluation of EU regio
J. Int. Econ., https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103319Welfare changeTw Ta Td V̂n3 33 33 3.144
0 25 25 3.139
5 50 25 3.140
5 25 50 3.1442We adjust the aggregate share of transfers spend on wage subsidies (Tw), investments in production amenities (Ta), and investments in transportation infrastructure (Td) as displayed in
columns 1–3. Then we derive the optimal spatial distribution of each transfer type as discussed in Section 5.3. The corresponding welfare gain relative to the no-transfer scenario is
displayed in column 4.
Overall, these counterfactual experiments show twomain results: First, a full concentration of expenditures on one type is not optimal. Second, as
long as there is a certain mix between the three transfer types, welfare is relatively insensitive regarding changes in the aggregate shares. It reacts
much more strongly to changes in the regional distribution of transfers, which is the focus of our analysis in Section 5.3. Note however that given
the setting with the input factor for infrastructure and production amenities not drawing away resources from other economic activities, the evalu-
ation of different mixes of aggregate shares is likely to be somewhat biased towards investments in infrastructure and production amenities.
On the other hand, infrastructure is a durable investment and generates benefits over several years. Our analysis quantifies the static welfare
gains realized from improvements in production amenities and transportation infrastructure attained at the end of the respective budgeting period
2007–13. For investments in infrastructure and production amenities, our estimated elasticities κa, κd capture the cumulative effect of the sum of in-
vestments over these seven years. In contrast, for wage subsidies – assuming immediate adjustment – it requires only a one-year transfer to realize
the welfare effect. As infrastructure is durable, a part of the benefit is likely to remain after the end of the budgeting period, whereas the benefit of
wage subsidies vanishes relatively quickly once transfers are stopped.
In the following back-of-the-envelope calculation, we adjust the static welfare effect of infrastructure investments by differences in initial costs,
durability and maintenance costs in order to compare themwith the welfare effect estimated for wage subsidies. For this analysis, we assume a dis-
count rate of 5 percent and an average remaining lifetime of the infrastructure investments after the end of the budgeting period of 26 years. The
latter is based on the literature suggesting a depreciation of roads of about 30 years.43 Using these values, we obtain a discount factor of DF ¼ ∑26t¼1
1
ð1:05Þt ¼ 14:38. The present value of the benefits from infrastructure investments is the static gain multiplied with DF. On the cost side, we need to
account for the fact that infrastructure paymentsweremade over seven years and thatmaintenance costswill apply during the 26 years of remaining
lifetime. According to the EU Parliament (2014), the EU invested about 41% of initial road investments into maintenance and operating during the
period of 2006–11. Taking the cost shares of infrastructure investments and wage subsidies (of 0.34 and 0.29), this implies in our calculation that
the costs of infrastructure investments compared to wage subsidies are higher by Cost Factor ¼ 7 0:34ð1þ 0:41DFÞ
0:29
. Note that the maintenance
costs are a share of initial investments and, as they apply in the future, have to be discounted by DF as well. Given these considerations, we can
now compute the adjusted welfare effect of infrastructure investments (for the observed equilibrium in Table 2c, column 2), which would be 0:82
DF
Cost Factor
¼ 0:21. Comparing the adjusted welfare effect of infrastructure with the static welfare effect of wage subsidies of 0.05 in the observed
equilibrium (in Table 2a, column 2) shows that the welfare gain due to infrastructure investments is about four times higher.
With regard to investments in production amenities, which consist of a bundle of measures that affect productivity, we cannot perform such a
back-of-the-envelope calculation as we have neither data on the maintenance costs nor on average lifetime.D.3. Region-specific factor prices for the production of infrastructure
In the following, we outline how our setting would change if we assumed that transportation infrastructure and production amenities are pro-
duced using local factors, i.e. land and final goods, in each region. We lay out the model extension for investments in transportation infrastructure
noting that the case of production amenities follows analogously. Land and final goods are used to produce infrastructure according to a Cobb-
Douglas technology such that transfers Tnd yield infrastructure investments.
Dn ¼ T
d
n
Pαn r1−αn
: ðD:1Þ
Infrastructure investments translate into reductions of travel time according to Eq. (11) which becomes.
TravelTimeri ¼ γri−κd  ln Dr þ Di þ 1ð Þ: ðD:2Þ
In this model extension, a given level of transfers yields a more pronounced travel time reduction in low price regions than in high price regions,
which would shift the optimal distribution towards low price regions. In the following, we characterize how these changes affect the housing and
goods markets. Since transportation infrastructure is now produced using local land and final goods, regional income is given by (13) where pay-
ments from the global portfolio change to χ ¼ ð1=LÞ∑n∈NðιnHnrnÞ. Total expenditure on goods and housing markets is now composed of workers'the construction of
period.
nal transfers,
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.
wnλn ¼ α
X
k∈N
πknλk yk þ Tak=Lk þ Tdk=Lk
 
: ðD:3ÞAnalogously, total housing expenditure becomes.
rnHn ¼ 1−αð Þ ynLn þ Tan þ Tdn
 
: ðD:4Þ
In this model extension, government investments into local infrastructure affect prices indirectly by a change in local demand for land and final
goods, which feeds back into regional income. As we do not have empirical information about the specific cost structure of infrastructure production,
we assume that the expenditure share equals theworkers' consumption share α=0.75.We compute themarginal welfare effects of transfers in the
model extension as shown in Fig. 4 for the benchmark model. The correlation coefficient (rank correlation coefficient in brackets) of the marginal
welfare effects of investments in production amenities in the model extension and the benchmark mode is 0.962 (0.948). For investments in trans-
portation infrastructure the correlation is 0.966 (0.976).Marginalwelfare effects ofwage subsidies remain almost identical to the benchmark version.References
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